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1 Introduction  
“Any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of 
the poor, the other of the rich; these are at war with one another” 
Plato (trans. 1973, p. 111) 
 
This quotation by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato reveals that 
social and economic inequalities have been a concern in human socie-
ties throughout history. In the last millennia since, social inequality has 
not lost any of its significance. In recent years, “The Spirit Level” by 
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett (2009), “The Price of Inequality” by 
Joseph Stiglitz (2012), and Thomas Piketty’s (2014) “Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century” have become international bestsellers and have 
received extensive media coverage. The ample academic and popular 
attention that these books received signals the importance of wealth 
and income inequality in current public, political, and scientific debate. 
The mentioned books paint a picture of a world with increasing inequal-
ity, which is associated with manifold social and economic problems in 
societies. 
The present thesis seeks to contribute to the inequality debate by 
regarding economic inequality from a psychological point of view. In 
particular, inequality will be experimentally investigated and discussed 
from different perspectives associated to it. Two of these perspectives 
are mentioned in the opening quotation – the rich and the poor. How is 
inequality perceived by those who benefit (i.e., the rich) and those that 
suffer (i.e., the poor) from it? What are the consequences of inequality 
for individuals and for society?  
In particular, I will investigate how inequality is connected to per-
ceptions of justice and what this association suggests with regard to 
people’s feelings (i.e., affect and emotions) and their preferred level of 
inequality. To investigate the preferred level of inequality, we focus on a 
democratic decision-making and explore the consequences of these de-
cisions for cooperation. 
2 
 
In the following parts of the introduction, I will first provide a short 
overview of the development of income and wealth inequality from the 
early twentieth century until recent years. I will primarily focus on the 
Western world and conclude by illustrating the status quo. The next 
section will review the literature on the association between inequality 
and justice perceptions. After that, I will briefly review previous research 
on the potential consequences of inequality and I will then introduce 
the empirical research underlying this thesis. 
1.1 The development of income and wealth inequality 
In the present thesis, “inequality” refers to the economic compo-
nent of social inequality, denoting the unequal distribution of income 
and the unequal distribution of wealth. Wealth and income define two 
related, but distinct concepts. Income generally captures the earnings of 
an individual or a household from various sources over a certain period, 
while wealth captures the fortune—usually measured at the household 
level—possessed at a certain point in time (Keister, 2014). 
Most of today’s scholars seem to agree that income inequality, es-
pecially in the Western world, has risen in recent years. The Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reported that, 
over the past three decades, income inequality, measured by the Gini 
coefficient—a popular measure of inequality—showed an average overall 
increase, increasing in 17 of 22 OECD countries for which correspond-
ing information existed. During that period, particularly large increases 
in income inequality were witnessed in countries such as New Zealand 
and the United States of America (US) (Cingano, 2014).  
In Anglo-Saxon countries, the development of income inequality 
during the twentieth century was found to represent a stylized U-
shaped curve. Income inequality decreased during and shortly after the 
Second World War and saw a period of stabilization during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Finally, starting in the early 1980s, an increase caused in-
come inequality to return to its pre-war levels (Alvaredo, Atkinson, 
Piketty, & Saez, 2013; Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2011; Piketty & Saez, 
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2003, 2006). In 2010, 44% of the total income in the US was earned by 
the top 10 percent of US earners with the top one percent receiving 17% 
of total income (Keister, 2014). Since then, the already high shares of 
income obtained by top earners seem to have risen further, as indicated 
by data from Saez (2015), which shows that the top 10 percent in the 
US income distribution received 47% of that year’s total income in 
2014. Put differently, those at the very top of the income distribution 
(the top 0.01 percent) earned about 489 times the average income. 
However, the phenomenon of increasing income inequality is not 
limited to the Anglo-Saxon world. Although research has indicated that 
income inequality in central Europe, for instance, has been more stable 
than in countries such as the US since the end of World War II (Alvardo 
et al., 2013; Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty & Saez, 2006), even countries 
with comparatively egalitarian backgrounds, such as Sweden or Ger-
many, have also witnessed increasing income inequality over the past 
three decades (Bach, Corneo, & Steiner, 2009; Cingano, 2014). Bach 
and colleagues (2009) reported a six percent increase in the German 
Gini coefficient between 1992 and 2003. This increase in income ine-
quality was found to result from income changes for the top German 
earners. During this period, the real mean incomes of the top 0.001 
percent of German earners rose by 46.6%, however, overall real incomes 
did not change. Therefore, the top 0.001 percent of German earners 
earned about 819 times the average German income in 2003. Further-
more, the authors reported that 41% of the total income was earned by 
the top 10 percent of German earners in the same year (Bach et al., 
2009). Hence, the presented results indicate a recent rise of income ine-
quality not only in the US but also in large parts of the world and illus-
trate the widening gap between those at the top of the income distribu-
tion and everyone else. 
The development of wealth inequality in the twentieth century dif-
fered from the previously described development of income inequality. 
After the top 1% of US wealth holders lost severe shares of the total 
wealth from the early 1930s to the late 1940s, the distribution of wealth 
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remained relatively stable until 2000 (Kopzuk & Saez, 2004). Since 
then, wealth inequality has either risen or remained stable depending 
on its operationalization. For instance, Keister (2014) reported that be-
tween 2001 and 2010 the net worth (e.g. assets minus debts) Gini coef-
ficient for US households increased significantly. However, the share of 
wealth owned by the wealthiest one percent of US citizens has remained 
relatively stable, slightly increasing from 32% in 2001 to 34% in 2010. 
Nevertheless, in general, wealth seemed to be highly concentrated with 
the top 10 percent of the wealthiest US citizens owning 74% of total 
wealth in 2010 (Keister, 2014). This statistics illustrate a robust finding 
in the research on wealth and income inequality; wealth is even more 
unequally distributed than income. With regard to the wealth dispari-
ties outside of the US, Davies, Sandström, Shorrocks, and Wolff (2009) 
estimated the worldwide distribution of wealth for the year 2000. Based 
on wealth data covering 59% of the world’s population, the authors as-
sumed that the world’s wealthiest 10% held 71% of the worldwide 
wealth.  
In summary, the reviewed literature suggests the distribution of 
wealth and the distribution of income to be highly unequal. In large 
parts of the developed world income inequality seems to have signifi-
cantly risen in recent decades, and wealth inequality has at least stabi-
lized at a high level. 
1.2 Inequality, justice, and democracy 
These high and even rising levels of inequality in the Western world 
may appear astonishing if we recall that the prevailing political system 
in these nations is democracy. By definition, democracy is “a system of 
government in which all the people of a state […] are involved in making 
decisions about its affairs, typically by voting to elect representatives to 
a parliament or similar assembly” (Democracy, n., 2015). As mentioned 
above, inequality is frequently and controversially debated in politics 
and is thus likely to be one of the crucial topics that people consider 
when they are deciding for whom to vote to represent them. Therefore, 
5 
 
the level of inequality in a given democratic system should actually be 
decided on by the people concerned, for example, by empowering repre-
sentatives because of their agenda for redistribution policies. 
However, in contrast to the recent increases in inequality, research 
findings have indicated that people commonly hold egalitarian prefer-
ences (e.g., Dawes, Fowler, Johnson, McElreath, & Smirnov, 2007) and 
act in inequality-averse ways (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000) with regard to the distribution of economic resources 
(e.g., income and wealth). Among others, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have 
argued that this preference for equal distributions and behavioral ten-
dency towards establishing economic equality is possibly based on jus-
tice concerns. 
Indeed, research has shown that people rely on certain principles 
of justice to distribute resources such as income and wealth (Adams, 
1965; Deutsch, 1975). In this context, social psychology usually distin-
guishes between three justice principles. According to these principles, 
distributions can be considered just when they reflect the efforts of the 
concerned parties (the equity principle), when they concern the necessi-
ties of those in need (the need principle), or when they distribute the 
available resources in equally large shares (the equality principle) (Ad-
ams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Homans, 1961). Among these justice princi-
ples, the equality principle plays a special role, as it is the principle that 
demands the least amount of information to be considered applicable. 
When people evaluate how fairly societal wealth and income are 
distributed, objective information about the relative performance and 
neediness of the concerned parties is likely to be scarce at best, which 
might lead to the application of the equality principle. In accordance 
with this line of thought, recent research has found a remarkably wide-
spread consensus on the just distribution of wealth (Norton & Ariely, 
2011). People tend to consider a low degree of inequality more just and 
in generally preferable to a high degree of inequality (Lotz & 
Fetchenhauer, 2012; Norton & Ariely, 2011). However, as previously 
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depicted, inequality in democratic societies has been increasing in re-
cent decades.  
To understand how these seemingly contradictory findings are 
compatible, it seems rewarding to investigate whether and for whom 
justice perceptions actually affect decisions that impact the societal lev-
el of inequality. For instance, if a potential beneficiary of high inequality 
perceives inequality to be unjust, what determines whether he will favor 
high inequality in his own self-interest or low inequality for the sake of 
justice? In Chapter 3, we experimentally investigated the democratic 
implementation of inequality and its association with justice concerns 
to obtain new insights into this relationship. 
1.3 Inequality and its consequences 
In the previous introductory sections, we illustrated that the world 
continues to witness notable, presumably increasing inequality, alt-
hough many people tend to be inequality-averse and perceive inequality 
to be unjust. Hence, a question arises about the consequences of this 
paradox. 
In the opening quotation Plato metaphorically described the conse-
quence of inequality as war between the rich and the poor (Plato, trans. 
1973). If we believe scholars who criticize inequality, the devastating 
effects of inequality in numerous areas of society may justify this dras-
tic comparison. Research from various scientific fields and backgrounds 
has associated wealth and income inequality with a growing number of 
societal problems (for an overview, see Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009b). For 
example, high inequality has been linked to high levels of crime 
(Kaplan, Pamuk, Lynch, Cohen, & Balfour, 1996; Pickett, Mookherjee, & 
Wilkinson, 2005; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2007); poor education (Kaplan et 
al., 1996; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2007); diminished physical, mental, and 
emotional well-being (Dawes et al., 2007; Kondo, Sembajwe, Kawachi, 
Dam, & Subramanian, 2009; Layte, 2012; Oishi, Kesebir, & Diener, 
2011; Subramanian & Kawachi, 2004); and low trust, decreased socie-
tal cooperation, and reduced economic growth (Knack & Keefer, 1997; 
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Zak & Knack, 2001). However, it has to be mentioned that the depicted 
relationships are not universally agreed upon and their actual existence 
has been questioned (e.g., Forbes, 2000; Goldthorpe, 2010; Saunders, 
2010).  
Therefore, as part of the present thesis, I will focus on experimen-
tally investigating the affective, emotional, and cooperative consequenc-
es of inequality, as these constructs arguably possess high importance 
in the research areas of psychology and economics. 
Affect and emotions will be differentiated in detail in Chapter 2.1.3. 
However, affect generally relates to broad conditions of feelings (Watson 
& Clark, 1999), which are usually distinguished by their valence (i.e., 
positive affect and negative affect), while emotions are more specific and 
are subsumed by affect (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
In the present research, affect and emotions are of particular inter-
est because they motivate and thereby strongly influence human behav-
ior (for a recent meta-analysis, see Colquitt et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
emotions have been argued to mediate the effect of inequality on other 
societal problems, such as physical and mental well-being (Layte, 2012; 
Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009b). Therefore, the affective and emotional con-
sequences of inequality play a crucial role in the current inequality de-
bate. 
With regard to the emotional consequences of inequality, high ine-
quality has been linked to low levels of happiness. Using data from 
1972 to 2008, Oishi and colleagues (2011) found that Americans were 
happier when national income inequality was relatively low. In addition, 
Dawes and associates (2007) reported that inequality causes negative 
emotions to be directed towards its beneficiaries and argued that these 
negative emotions motivate inequality-averse behavior. However, the 
specific affective and emotional consequences of inequality to some ex-
tent remain unclear. As will be regarded in detail in Chapter 2, particu-
larly affective and emotional differences between the advantaged and 
disadvantaged of inequality seem underresearched. 
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Furthermore, the present research will focus on the association be-
tween inequality and cooperation. Cooperation might be one of the most 
extensively researched concepts in social science and there is no dis-
pute about its vital contribution to the prosperity of a society. Through 
its close ties to social capital, cooperation has been a crucial part of the 
inequality debate over the last decades (e.g., Putnam, 2000). For in-
stance, scholars have previously argued that high inequality is associ-
ated with low levels of trust resulting in reduced cooperation with severe 
economic consequences, such as diminished economic growth (Knack & 
Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001).  
However, experimental findings concerning the impact of inequality 
on cooperation have been contradictory, showing inequality to either 
harm, foster, or not affect cooperation (Anderson, Mellor, & Milyo, 2008; 
Chan, Mestelman, Moir, & Muller, 1996; Haile, Sadrieh, & Verbon, 
2008). Recent research has indicated that these incoherent results may 
partially be explained by considering the origin of inequality to be the 
determinant for its consequences (e.g., Greiner, Ockenfels, & Werner, 
2012; Haile et al., 2008). Thus, in the context of the potential conse-
quences of rising inequality in the Western world, the association be-
tween inequality resulting from a democratic decision-making process 
and cooperation seems to be particularly interesting and is investigated 
in detail in Chapter 4. 
1.4 Overview of the empirical research 
Together with Detlef Fetchenhauer, Thomas Schlösser, and Daniel 
Ehlebracht, I experimentally investigated the psychological determi-
nants and consequences of economic inequality in three different stud-
ies. Of the many aspects that inequality comprises, we particularly fo-
cused on the association between inequality and justice (Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3) as well as its consequences for affects, emotions, and coop-
eration (Chapter 2 and Chapter 4).  
In this context, inequality as conceived in Chapter 2 might be most 
comparable to income inequality because it emerges as a consequence 
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of individuals’ performance in a working task. Inequality as conceived in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 might be most comparable to wealth inequali-
ty because it is the result of a random assignment to an advantageous 
or disadvantageous societal position, as is inheritance. Nevertheless, all 
inequalities examined within this research project are closely related, as 
they share an economic or monetary basis. 
In Chapter 2, we experimentally explored the emotional and affec-
tive consequences of inequality and their association to justice percep-
tions. In particular, our participants had to solve effort-based tasks and 
were assigned to compensation systems referred to as tournament sys-
tem and equality system. Whereas tournament systems evoked high 
outcome disparities, equality systems, as they were applied, caused 
equal outcome distributions. In accordance with prior research (e.g., 
Schlösser & Fetchenhauer, 2015), we found that the equality system 
was perceived to be more just than the tournament system. Yet, the ef-
fect of the system’s justice on affect and emotions was found to be small 
and both appeared, instead, to be crucially determined by the income 
and the status of a participant within a given system. For instance, 
those that benefited from the unequal tournament system perceived the 
system to be unjust but reported the highest positive affect and the low-
est negative affect, anger, and guilt. A possible explanation might be 
that—within our research paradigm—beneficiaries cannot be hold ac-
countable for the negative consequences of the exogenously determined 
compensation systems which might detach their justice perceptions and 
affects as well as emotions. 
In Chapter 3, we investigated whether a person’s personal sensitiv-
ity towards justice (i.e., justice sensitivity) predicts equality preferences 
in democratic systems. As previously stated, unequal distributions are 
likely to be perceived as unjust (e.g., Deutsch, 1975), hence, we as-
sumed that persons who are truly concerned about the just treatment 
of others (i.e., other-sensitive persons) hold a genuine preference for 
equal distributions and low inequality. Persons who show the tendency 
to predominantly care about a just treatment for themselves (i.e., vic-
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tim-sensitive persons) were instead assumed to hold no genuine distri-
butional preferences, but rather prefer the degree of inequality within 
their monetary self-interest. With the help of a so-called welfare state 
game (e.g., Biniossek & Fetchenhauer, 2007; Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 
2012), we measured equality preferences in a democratic decision-
making process. Indeed, other-sensitive persons displayed a general 
preference for low inequality irrespective of whether they financially 
gained or lost out on that decision. In contrast, victim-sensitive persons 
preferred either low inequality or high inequality depending on whether 
the one or the other was in their financial interest.  
In Chapter 4, we finally investigated the relationship between dem-
ocratically determined economic inequality and cooperation. Based on 
previous research which found that in particular endogenously induced 
inequality harms preconditions for cooperative behavior, such as trust 
(e.g., Greiner et al., 2012), we assumed that democratically induced in-
equality hampers cooperation. In accordance with this assumption, we 
found that groups which previously implemented high inequality 
through a majority choice displayed relatively low levels of cooperation 
compared to groups which previously implemented low inequality. In 
addition, we found that the mechanism driving this effect is likely based 
on motivated reasoning rather than based on self-selection, similarity, 
risk, or inequality aversion. These findings suggest that high degrees of 
inequality harm cooperation in democratic systems.  
Chapter 5 provides an integrative discussion of the presented em-
pirical research findings, while Chapter 6 suggests possible paths for 
future research. 
1.5 Coauthors’ contributions 
The manuscript underlying Chapter 2 is an article published in the 
journal Wirtschaftspsychologie and authored by myself and my coau-
thors Thomas Schlösser and Detlef Fetchenhauer (2015a). Thomas 
Schlösser gave advice concerning the experimental design, the analysis 
of the data, and the preparation of the manuscript. Detlef Fetchenhauer 
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gave advice concerning the experimental design and the preparation of 
the manuscript.  
The manuscript underlying Chapter 3 is prepared for submission 
to the journal Social Justice Research and coauthored by Thomas 
Schlösser, Daniel Ehlebracht, and Detlef Fetchenhauer. All three coau-
thors contributed ideas for the experimental design used to investigate 
the research target and commented on various drafts of the manuscript. 
The manuscript underlying Chapter 4 is prepared for submission 
to The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics and coau-
thored by Thomas Schlösser, Daniel Ehlebracht, and Detlef 
Fetchenhauer. Thomas Schlösser contributed ideas for the experimental 
execution of the research question, gave advice concerning data analy-
sis, and commented on various drafts of the manuscript. Daniel 
Ehlebracht and Detlef Fetchenhauer also contributed ideas for the ex-
perimental implementation of the research question and commented on 
various drafts of the manuscript. Due to the guidelines of the targeted 
journal the style of writing in Chapter 4 slightly differs from remaining 
text. For instance, tenses are used differently and alternative rules for 
capitalization are applied. 
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2 It’s a shame, but I’m not to blame: Perceived justice, affect, and 
emotions in (un)equal compensation systems 
2.1 Introduction 
“The winner takes it all, the loser’s standing small” - These lyrics 
from a famous pop song by ABBA are also valid for several of the nu-
merous compensation systems in today’s working environment. Alt-
hough some approaches to compensation pay co-workers nearly alike, 
others treat them as competitors for high salaries, which may result in 
highly unequal incomes.  
An interesting but insufficiently explored question is how such 
compensation systems make people feel. Affect and emotions might de-
pend on whether a worker earns €400 or €4000, but they might also be 
affected if he or she learns that co-workers earn €500 more. Different 
incomes can result in status differences, which are assumed to elicit 
various emotions (Marmot, 2004; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009a). Addi-
tionally, if income differences between co-workers are high, such differ-
ences may be perceived as unjust. Hence, compensation systems that 
cause a high degree of income inequality may be perceived as unjust 
with possible consequences for affective states and emotions (Barclay & 
Kiefer, 2014; Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2013; 
Cropanzano, Stein, & Nadisic, 2011; Hillebrandt & Barclay, 2013). In 
this context, it might be important if persons feel accountable for expe-
rienced injustice (Festinger, 1957).  
After long being neglected as a determinant of organizational be-
havior (Grandey, 2000; Muchinsky, 2000), affective states and emo-
tions, such as anger and guilt, have been shown to influence people’s 
workplace behavior in both positive and negative ways (Barclay & Kief-
er, 2014; Lee & Allen, 2002; Miner & Glomb, 2010; Staw, Sutton, & 
Pelled, 1994). Hence, in times when economic inequality is controver-
sially discussed (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009a; Piketty, 2014), it seems 
especially interesting to explore the affective and emotional consequenc-
es of unequal payments. Therefore, we conducted an experimental 
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study comparing affective states, the emotions of anger and guilt, and 
their relation to perceived justice in compensation systems with equal 
and unequal payment distributions. 
2.1.1 Differences in compensation systems 
Compensation systems fundamentally differ in terms of wage dis-
tribution and income inequality. The compensation system of German 
state employees, for example, includes different pay levels; however, 
within these levels, people are compensated based on the principle of 
equality (Lerner, 1947). Such equality systems create little group ine-
quality but possess no rewards based on individual performance. The 
compensation of German teachers, for example, is not dependent on 
factors that heavily affect their workload, such as the subjects they 
teach or the number of exams they grade. The idea of equality-based 
payment is widespread. Such systems are not only commonly applied to 
approximately 4.6 million German state employees (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2013) but also are the basis of collective pay agreements 
with unions, affecting nearly every second German employee (IAB, 
2013).  
In contrast, other compensation systems are heavily performance-
based. In such tournament systems, performance relative to co-workers 
is more important for a person’s wage than the absolute performance 
(Becker & Huselid, 1992; Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014; 
Knoebler & Tsoulouhas, 2013; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Co-workers are 
set in the role of competitors, and the best workers receive high earn-
ings; the others get comparatively small amounts or even nothing. 
Hence, tournament systems lead to very unequal payment distributions 
and divide tournament members into two subgroups—the profiting 
tournament winners and the non-profiting tournament losers. 
Tournament compensation systems can predominantly be found 
in markets where people compete for a few positions that are compen-
sated with high amounts of money, such as professional sports 
(Bothner, Kang, & Stuart, 2007; Frank & Cook, 1996). In 2013, the 
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Wimbledon champion received £1.600.000, whereas first-round losers 
received only £23.500. Therefore, 50% of all Wimbledon players com-
bined received £1.504.000, which was less than the champion received 
alone (The All England Lawn Tennis Club, 2013). However, tournament 
compensation systems are not restricted to professional sports, but they 
are also apparent in the payment structures of most organizations. In 
the Western world, promotion systems can be seen as the most promi-
nent organizational tournaments (Backes-Gellner & Pull, 2013; Chlosta, 
Pull, & Futagami, 2014). In academics, for example, postdocs compete 
for tenure professorships and in companies employees compete for CEO 
compensations (Connelly et al., 2014).  
The most extreme form of tournament compensation is the win-
ner-take-all tournament in which the tournament losers receive no 
compensation at all (Backes-Gellner & Pull, 2013; Frank & Cook, 1996; 
Vandergrift, Yavas, & Brown, 2007). These are most common in bonus 
systems, such as “employee of the year” awards (Backes-Gellner & Pull, 
2013; Chlosta et al., 2014) but can also be the primary compensation 
system. In the insurance business some companies (Company A) do not 
employ their own front-desk salespeople but use those of a partner 
(Company B). Hence, employees of Company B do not receive wages 
from Company A. However, Company A incentivizes the front-desk su-
pervisors by awarding them expensive travel packages if their team sells 
more insurances of Company A than a certain percentage of the other 
teams (Backes-Gellner & Pull, 2013). 
Because we wanted to investigate the affective and emotional con-
sequences of payment inequality, we decided to compare winner-take-
all tournaments (in the following: tournament systems) and equality 
systems; to our knowledge, we are the first to do so. Both systems were 
chosen for the sake of clarity, knowing well that payment inequality in 
other applied compensation systems mostly falls somewhere in-between 
these extremes. 
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2.1.2 The justice of the system 
Research on organizational justice usually distinguishes four dif-
ferent dimensions of justice – distributive justice, procedural justice, 
interpersonal justice and informational justice (Colquitt, 2013; Ambrose 
& Schminke, 2008). To evaluate the justice of a compensation system 
distributive justice, meaning the perceived justice of outcomes (Adams, 
1965), and procedural justice, meaning the perceived justice of 
allocative procedures (Leventhal, 1980), seem particularly important.  
Generally, justice perceptions are not universal but differ between 
individuals and situations (Bediou, Sacharin, Hill, Sander, & Scherer, 
2012). For example, imagine two workers who both work an eight hours 
shift but produce different amounts of output. Some people might per-
ceive it to be just when payments are distributed evenly between these 
two (equality-principle), while others might perceive it to be just when 
individual rewards reflect individual performance (equity-principle) 
(Deutsch, 1975; see also Fischer & Wiswede, 2009). However, people 
who favor a payment distribution following the equity-principle at work 
may prefer the equality-principle for distributing the family income. 
Furthermore, some people may perceive a compensation system based 
on cooperation to be just as it reflects their ethical values, whereas oth-
ers may perceive a compensation system based on competition to be 
just as it allows for more control over their own wage (see Leventhal, 
1980 for rules of procedural justice). 
In this study participants were asked about the perceived justice of 
a compensation system, capturing both distributive and procedural jus-
tice aspects. This was done because specific justice dimensions only 
capture a small part of justice perceptions, while people’s final justice 
perception incorporates all relevant dimensions of justice (Ambrose & 
Schminke, 2009; Barclay & Kiefer, 2014). Equality systems distribute 
payments evenly among their members and are therefore based on co-
operation and the equality-principle. Tournament systems stimulate 
competition between co-workers, but might be perceived as unjust be-
cause they do not fulfill the equity- or equality-principle. Instead, tour-
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nament winners may be overcompensated with respect to their individ-
ual performance, and losers may be undercompensated. 
Additionally, researchers have argued that people are inequality 
averse as a result of perceiving inequality to be unjust (Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999; Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012). Lotz and Fetchenhauer (2012) as-
signed participants to different social classes and made them choose 
between two fictive societies; an equal society and an unequal, but rich-
er one. The equal society was not only preferred by unaffected third par-
ties and by those who benefited monetarily, but also by substantial 
numbers of those who lost out. Furthermore, their results showed that 
the equal society was perceived to be more just than the unequal socie-
ty. Inequality aversion has been reported across different cultures and 
among children, suggesting that this trait might be universal (Almas, 
Cappelen, Sorensen, & Tungodden, 2010; Fehr, Bernhard, & 
Rockenbach, 2008; Henrich et al., 2006).  
Nevertheless, it is further known that justice perceptions are influ-
enced by an egocentric bias stating that profiteers from a distributional 
system judge the system to be more just than would non-profiteers 
(Greenberg, 1983). Thus, justice perceptions might differ between tour-
nament winners and tournament losers. However, the latter suggestion 
was not supported by Schlösser and Fetchenhauer (2015), who com-
pared perceived justice in five different compensation systems and 
showed that equality members indeed perceived their system to be more 
just than tournament members did. Contrary to predictions deduced 
from the existence of an egocentric bias (Greenberg, 1985), the authors 
found no difference in justice ratings between tournament winners and 
losers. For these reasons, the perceived justice of the equality system 
should exceed the perceived justice of the tournament system. 
2.1.3 Differentiating affects and emotions 
When researchers explore people’s feelings, they often evaluate af-
fects and/or specific emotions (Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, 2015). Af-
fect represents a general condition of feeling (Watson & Clark, 1999) 
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which in this paper is specified as state affect, meaning affect at a cer-
tain point of time (Colquitt et al., 2013). Further, affect is usually divid-
ed into positive affect and negative affect with positive affect comprising 
pleasantness and high arousal and negative affect comprising unpleas-
antness and low arousal (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
In comparison to affect, emotions are more complex and differenti-
ated (Cameron et al., 2015). Generally, they are caused by an external 
or internal stimulus event which must possess a certain level of rele-
vance. Additionally, emotions are limited in time, differ in valence and 
arousal and often influence an individual’s behavior (Fischer & 
Wiswede, 2009; Scherer, 2005). Because positive affect subsumes emo-
tions with a positive valence (e.g., joy, pride) and negative affect sub-
sumes emotions with a negative valence (e.g., anger, guilt), affect and 
emotions are closely related (Colquitt et al., 2013; Watson et al., 1988). 
2.1.4 The affective and emotional consequences of (un)equal and 
(un)just compensation 
Theories of justice have long been associated with affect and emo-
tions (Adams, 1965; Hillebrandt & Barclay, 2013; Homans, 1961; 
Walster, Berscheid, & Walster 1976). In a recent meta-analytical study, 
Colquitt and colleagues (2013) reviewed the literature on the links be-
tween justice and affect. From appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Laza-
rus, 1991; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), they deduced that positive af-
fect should be positively associated with justice, whereas negative affect 
and justice should be negatively associated. Moderate correlations be-
tween justice and positive and negative affect supported these predic-
tions. Hence, the authors go even so far to claim that “justice seems to 
make people feel good to the same degree that injustice makes them feel 
bad” (Colquitt et al., 2013, p. 216).  
But why should injustice lead to negative affect among its victims 
and its profiteers? An important role in this context was assigned to the 
specific emotions of anger and guilt. While people who perceive them-
selves as undercompensated (non-profiteers) should feel angry, over-
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compensated people (profiteers) should feel guilty (Homans, 1961; 
Walster et al., 1976). This suggestion was supported by experimental 
results, showing that individuals experienced the most guilt when posi-
tive outcomes resulted from a procedure that is perceived to be unjust 
(Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano, 1999). Further research found that 
unjust procedures combined with unfavorable outcomes lead to nega-
tive emotions, such as anger and frustration, whereas unjust proce-
dures combined with favorable outcomes lead to negative emotions, 
such as guilt and anxiety (Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000). In summary, 
studies on justice, affect, and emotions show that both tournament los-
ers and winners are expected to experience negative affect and varying 
negative emotions, whereas equality members should experience pre-
dominantly positive affect.  
However, after a careful reading of cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957), it also appears plausible that justice perceptions will 
only have a minor influence on affects and emotions in respect to com-
pensation systems. Consider tournament winners who have earned a 
respectable amount of money but perceive the system to be unjust. 
These winners want to enjoy their achievement, but at the same time, 
they realize that justice norms were violated. Cognitive dissonance theo-
ry holds that the conflict between a person’s behaviors/cognitions (e.g., 
enjoying the win) and values that build their self-concept (e.g., justice 
norms) creates dissonance, leading to distress. This dissonance has 
been suggested as a reason for guilt among overcompensated people 
(Walster et al., 1976). At first sight, cognitive dissonance theory would 
predict tournament winners to experience negative affect and guilt; 
however, closer examination casts doubt on this assumption.  
Tournament winners might ask themselves a crucial question be-
fore feeling guilty: Am I to blame for the system’s injustice? The answer 
will most likely be no if the winner was not accountable for the system 
personally and could have shown no behavior that would have prevent-
ed injustice. Therefore, necessary preconditions for experiencing disso-
nance might not be fulfilled (for an overview, see Fischer & Wiswede, 
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2009). Consequently, tournament winners will probably not experience 
dissonance nor suffer from negative affect and guilt. 
Indirect evidence for non-existing dissonance in tournament sys-
tems can be deduced from the finding that winners and losers perceived 
the system’s justice in similar ways (Schlösser & Fetchenhauer, 2015). 
If dissonance had emerged, tournament winners would be expected to 
feel the need to reduce it; for example, by adjusting their values to their 
behavior (Festinger, 1957). Because this adjustment would have 
changed their concept of justice, the winners should have perceived the 
system to be more just than the tournament losers did. However, justice 
ratings were apparently unaffected by dissonance, indicating that dis-
sonance may not have occurred (Schlösser & Fetchenhauer, 2015). 
In this case, emotions in compensation systems might predomi-
nantly be influenced by the evaluation of personal outcome and status. 
Positive outcomes were shown to make people happy and proud, there-
by promoting positive affect, whereas negative outcomes were found to 
cause disappointment and anger, thereby promoting negative affect 
(Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000). Because of the strong relation between 
respect and status (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 
2006), one might think of tournament winners as high-status individu-
als who feel respected due to their high performance, whereas tourna-
ment losers might be thought of as low-status individuals due to their 
low performance. High status has been associated with positive emo-
tions, such as pride (Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Mesquita, 2000), whereas 
low status has been associated with experiencing negative emotions, 
such as anxiety and hostility (Gallo & Matthews, 2003). Hence, tourna-
ment losers should suffer from negative outcomes and low status, 
whereas winners should enjoy positive outcomes and high status.  
2.1.5 Study purpose 
This study aims to investigate affects, emotions, and their relation 
to justice perceptions in tournament and equality systems. Consistent 
with previous experimental findings (Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012; 
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Schlösser & Fetchenhauer, 2015), we assume that perceived justice is 
higher in the equality system than in the tournament system and does 
not differ between tournament winners and tournament losers. 
The investigation of affective states and emotions in the regarded 
compensation systems is to some extent explorative, which is why we 
refrain from postulating classical hypotheses. However, generally speak-
ing we believe to observe one out of two patterns.  
We might find that justice perceptions are crucially important for 
affect and emotions in compensation systems. On that condition, equal-
ity members should experience most positive affect, whereas tourna-
ment winners and tournament losers should both experience negative 
affect. More precisely, tournament winners should experience high lev-
els of guilt, whereas tournament losers should experience high levels of 
anger.  
On the contrary, we might find that justice perceptions are of mi-
nor importance for affect and emotions in compensation systems, be-
cause mostly these systems are externally imposed on people, who 
therefore, might not feel accountable for their consequences. On that 
condition, affect and emotions should be elicited by a person’s amount 
of payment and his or her status. Consequently, and in contrast to the 
first scenario, tournament winners should experience most positive af-
fect and do not feel guilty, whereas tournament losers should still expe-
rience most negative affect and feel particularly angry.  
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Sample 
After being approached at the campus of a large German universi-
ty, 448 persons made an appointment for their participation in an ex-
perimental study. Ten participants (two tournament winners; eight 
tournament losers) had to be excluded from the analysis because of ex-
perimenter mistakes, wrong answered sample questions, or incomplete 
questionnaires. Therefore, 438 persons (92 equality members; 86 tour-
nament winners; 260 tournament losers) remained in the adjusted  
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Figure 1: Example of an effort-based task given to the participants 
Example: 749237757692048  749227757692048  
 749237757682048   
       749237157692078   
       748237757692048   
       749237757692048 
Note. Participants had to find the 15-digit code given on the left side among 
those given on the right. 
sample. Of these participants, 253 (57.8%) were females and 185 
(42.2%) were males; the participants were aged between 17 and 37 
years (M = 23.16; SD = 3.16). 
2.2.2 Participants and procedure 
The study consisted of three phases. After random placing, all par-
ticipants received instructions stating that they have been assigned to a 
randomly chosen group of four and were assured of their anonymity. 
Further, it was explained that in Phase 2 effort-based tasks (for an ex-
ample see Figure 1), each worth €0.20, should be solved within 12 
minutes and that their individual wage would depend on the number of 
tasks solved correctly by themselves and their fellow group members. 
Effort-based tasks were chosen as effort proved to be highly relevant for 
job performance in everyday life, regardless of whether the focus is on 
regular workers or highly skilled experts (Ackerman, 2014). 
In the following instructions, participants were informed about the 
respective compensation system applied in their group. In the equality 
system, individual wages were calculated by counting the number of 
tasks correctly solved by all group members, multiplying that number 
by €0.20 and distributing the amount equally. Members of this group 
were analyzed as a single homogenous group (individually termed 
equality members) because emotions and justice perceptions did not 
differ between those performing better than average and the others. In 
the tournament system, the group member with the highest amount of 
correct answers received the payment for the correct answers provided 
by all group members, and the others received no pay. In the results 
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section, the participants of this system are divided into tournament 
winners and tournament losers.  
Because people interacted in groups of four, every tournament sys-
tem generated one tournament winner and three tournament losers. 
Hence, to keep the design economically efficient we decided to level the 
number of tournament winners and equality members by assigning 
20% of participants to the equality system and 80% of participants to 
the tournament system. 
To ensure that every participant understood the applied compensa-
tion system, participants had to answer two sample questions. The in-
structions were then collected by the experimenter, who handed out the 
tasks for Phase 2 and started the 12-minute working period. At the end 
of this period, participants handed back their sheets, and wages were 
calculated. 
Next, Phase 3 was conducted by distributing a questionnaire, 
which first provided information about the results of the group task. 
Participants learned the number of tasks that their group solved cor-
rectly, the total amount of money earned by the group, and the individ-
ual wages of all group members, including the participants’ own pay-
ment. This information was followed by a question about the perceived 
justice of the applied compensation system (Irrespective of your own 
pay-off, how just do you principally judge the system of payment to be?) 
which was adopted from Schlösser and Fetchenhauer (2015). Anchors 
ranged from 1(not at all just) to 7 (very just). Low ratings indicated per-
ceived injustice and high ratings indicated perceived justice.  
Questions asking about the participants’ current emotional state 
followed. These questions were adopted from the German version 
(Grühn, Kotter-Grühn, & Röcke, 2010) of the Positive and Negative Af-
fect Schedule – Expanded Form (PANAS-X) (Watson & Clark, 1999) con-
taining scales for affective states and various specific emotions. The 
scales for positive affect (10 items; α = .84), negative affect (10 items; α 
= .87), and guilt (6 items; α = .79) were used to assess the correspond-
ing affective and emotional states. As the PANAS-X contains no explicit 
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anger scale, we used its hostility scale (6 items; α = .86) as a substitute 
measure. This scale includes the item anger and has been shown to be 
moderately to strongly correlated with other frequently applied anger 
measures, for example, the State-Trait Anger Scale of Spielberger et al. 
(1983) (Watson & Clark, 1999). Although we were primarily interested 
in the four mentioned scales, we included all items of the PANAS-X ex-
cept for those which were only related to the fatigue scale. This was 
done for explorative reasons and to account for experimenter demand 
effects. Hence, participants had to answer 56 items. Sample items are 
excited and proud (positive affect), afraid and upset (negative affect), an-
gry and hostile (anger), and guilty and blameworthy (guilt). Anchors 
ranged from 1(not at all) to 5 (very strongly). Emotion- and affect-scales 
were z-standardized on the group level before analysis to illustrate posi-
tive and negative influences of a certain group affiliation (equality mem-
ber; tournament winner; tournament loser) more clearly. Participants 
ended the questionnaire by providing socio-demographic information. 
2.3 Results 
How just do people perceive the given compensation systems, and 
how do they experience them affectively and emotionally? First answers 
to these questions are determined based on a MANOVA with group 
membership (equality member, tournament loser, tournament winner) 
as the independent variable and perceived system justice, negative af-
fect, positive affect, anger, and guilt as dependent variables; F [10, 862] 
= 19.87, p < .001, partial η² = .19. Because groups sizes were unequal 
and Levene’s test indicated unequal variances for negative affect (F (2, 
435) = 8.12, p < .001), guilt (F (2, 435) = 3.65, p = .03), and anger (F (2, 
435) = 18.70, p < .001), we used a stratified bootstrapping procedure 
based on 3000 samples and group membership as stratification criteri-
on to compute the MANOVA and the follow-up ANOVAs. Additionally, 
post-hoc testing was conducted via Dunnett’s T3 test, which accounts 
for unequal sample sizes and unequal variances (Dunnett, 1980). Please 
note that similar results were obtained by applying several other meth- 
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Table 1: Means and standard deviations for equality members, 
tournament winners, and tournament losers 
 Equality Winner Loser 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Justice 4.42 1.74 2.88 1.68 2.52 1.59 
Positive Affect .18 .96 .74 1.05 -.31 .85 
Negative Affect -.12 .93 -.34 .81 .16 1.05 
Anger -.15 .78 -.41 .59 .19 1.12 
Guilt -.19 1.00 -.37 .84 .19 1.01 
Note. Equality = Equality members, Winner = Tournament winner, Loser = Tourna- 
ment loser; z-scores are presented for positive affect, negative affect, anger, and guilt 
ods, such as Welch’s t-tests and Scheffé tests, which underline the ro-
bustness of our findings. Significance levels of the more familiar Scheffé 
test were included for comparison. Group means and standard devia-
tions are reported in Table 1. 
First, how did the participants perceive the justice of the compen-
sation systems? In general, the results supported our assumptions. 
Figure 2 shows that the equality system was perceived to be more just 
than the tournament system; F [2, 435] = 46.21, p < .001, partial η² = 
.18. In particular, post-hoc testing indicated that justice ratings of 
equality members exceeded those of tournament winners (T3 p < .001, 
Scheffé p < .001, d = .90) and tournament losers (T3 p < .001, Scheffé p 
< .001, d = 1.14), whereas the winners and losers did not differ from 
each other, T3 p = .22, Scheffé p = .20, d = .22. 
Justice perceptions thus differed between the systems, but did par-
ticipants’ affects and emotions also differ? Generally this question can 
be answered in the affirmative; all regarded affects and emotions were 
to some extent experienced differently between the three groups (9.03 < 
F [2, 435] < 45.14, p < .001) with partial η² ranging from .04 (negative 
affect) over .06 (anger; guilt) to .17 (positive affect). But how did they 
differ specifically? 
Which participants experienced the most positive affect, those per-
ceiving more justice in the equality system or those enjoying high in-
comes in the tournament system? Figure 3 shows that tournament 
winners did. Post-hoc tests revealed statistically significant differences  
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Figure 2: The system’s perceived justice for equality members, 
tournament winners, and tournament losers 
Note. p = Significance level; Equality = Equality member; Loser = Tournament loser, 
 Winner = Tournament winner. 
between all three groups. Tournament winners felt more positive affect 
than the equality members (T3 p = .001, Scheffé p < .001, d = .56) and 
the tournament losers (T3 p < .001, Scheffé p < .001, d = .1.10), where-
as equality members reported significantly higher positive affect than 
the tournament losers, T3 p < .001, Scheffé p < .001, d = .54.  
Which participants felt the most negative affect? Did both, tourna-
ment losers and winners experience negative affect as assumed by jus-
tice theories? Figure 4 reveals that losers felt the highest negative affect 
followed by equality members and tournament winners. Differences be-
tween tournament losers and winners were significant (T3 p < .001, 
Scheffé p < .001, d = .53), whereas equality members did not differ sig-
nificantly either from tournament losers (T3 p = .06, Scheffé p = .07, d = 
-.28) or from tournament winners (T3 p = .27, Scheffé p = .34, d = .25). 
Hence, significant differences in negative affect between tournament 
winners and tournament losers, who perceived the system’s justice sim-
ilarly, foster the impression that the justice of a system is of minor im-
portance for affective experiences; however, is there evidence for a rela-
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4 
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Equality Loser Winner 
p < .001 
p = .22 
Justice 
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tionship between a system’s justice and the emotions of anger and 
guilt? 
Did tournament losers feel angry as generally assumed? The re-
sults show that tournament losers indeed felt most angry (see Figure 5). 
More precisely, post-hoc tests revealed that their anger levels were sig-
nificantly higher than those of tournament winners (T3 p < .001, 
Scheffé p < .001, d = .67) and those of equality members (T3 p = .01, 
Scheffé p = .02, d = .35), whereas tournament winners experienced less 
anger than equality members, T3 p = .04, Scheffé p = .21, d = -.38. 
Thus, tournament winners experienced the least anger of the regarded 
groups. 
Did tournament winners, as profiteers of an unjust system feel 
guilty? Interestingly, Figure 6 shows that tournament losers rather than 
winners reported the most guilt. Tournament losers felt more guilty 
than both tournament winners (T3 p < .001, Scheffé p < .001, d = .60) 
and equality members (T3 p = .01, Scheffé p = .01, d = .38). Feelings of 
guilt by tournament winners and equality members did not differ signif-
icantly, T3 p = .45, Scheffé p = .45, d = -.20. Therefore, results were in-
consistent with the predicted relationship between justice and guilt. In-
stead, this finding favors the assumption that tournament winners do 
not experience negative feelings because they do not feel accountable for 
the injustice of their system. 
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Figure 3: Level of positive affect for equality members, tournament 
winners, and tournament losers 
Note. p = Significance level; Equality = Equality member; Loser = Tournament loser, 
Winner = Tournament winner. 
Figure 4: Level of negative affect for equality members, tourna-
ment winners, and tournament losers 
 
Note. p = Significance level; Equality = Equality member; Loser = Tournament loser, 
Winner = Tournament winner. 
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Figure 5: Level of anger for equality members, tournament winners, 
and tournament losers 
 
Note. p = Significance level; Equality = Equality member; Loser = Tournament loser, 
Winner = Tournament winner. 
Figure 6: Level of guilt for equality members, tournament winners, 
and tournament losers 
 
Note. p = Significance level; Equality = Equality member; Loser = Tournament loser, 
Winner = Tournament winner. 
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If perceived justice is of minor importance, winning the tournament 
should make people experience high positive affect, low negative affect, 
plus low levels of anger, and guilt, because personal income and status 
may primarily influence their affects and emotions. To test this predic-
tion, we conducted separate heteroscedasticity-consistent regression 
analyses (Hayes & Cai, 2007) for all examined affects and emotions with 
tournament losers as reference group and the independent variables, 
being a tournament winner (dummy-variable), being an equality mem-
ber (dummy-variable), the system’s perceived justice, and interaction 
effects between the dummy-variables and the system’s perceived justice. 
Does being a tournament winner thus influence positive affect 
more strongly than the system’s perceived justice? Yes; perceived justice 
does not influence positive affect (Table 2). Being a tournament winner 
(b = 1.05; p < .001) or an equality member (b = .46; p < .001) was posi-
tively associated with positive affect, whereas the system’s perceived 
justice was a non-significant predictor. Further, we found no moderat-
ing effects of group membership on the influence of a system’s perceived 
justice. Hence, participants who saw the system as just did not experi-
ence more or less positive affect than those who did not, but winners 
enjoyed winning. 
A system’s perceived justice may thus be unimportant for positive 
affect, but how is it related to negative affect? Participants who per-
ceived a system to be just reported less negative affect, but winning the 
tournament lowered negative affect even more strongly (Table 2). Nega-
tive affect was negatively related to perceived justice (b = -.07; p = .03) 
and being a tournament winner (b = -.47; p < .001), whereas no moder-
ations for the system’s perceived justice were evident. Therefore, partic-
ipants who perceived justice to be low reported higher negative affect, 
but winning the tournament overcompensated for these consequences 
of injustice. 
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Table 2: Regressions for positive affect and negative affect with 
and without interaction effects 
Variable Positive Affect Negative Affect 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Constant -.33*** (.07) -.32*** (.07) .25** (.08) .30** (.08) 
Winner  1.05*** (.13) .97*** (.20) -.47*** (.11) -.69*** (.17) 
Equality .46*** (.12) .51* (.23) -.15 (.13) -.15 (.28) 
Justice .01 (.03) .01 (.04) -.07* (.03) -.09* (.04) 
JusticexWinner  .04 (.08)  .12 (.07) 
JusticexEquality  -.01 (.07)  .02 (.08) 
R² .17 .17 .05 .06 
ΔR² .17 .00 .05 .01 
 
F(3,434) = 
26.22,  
p < .001 
F(2,432) = 
.18,  
p = .83 
F(3,434) = 
8.65,  
p < .001 
F(2,432) = 
1.50, 
 p = .23 
Note. ***p<.001; **p<.01;*p<.05 b = Regression coefficients; SE = Heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard error; Reference group = Tournament loser; Winner = Dummy-
variable for tournament winner; Equality = Dummy-variable for equality member. 
 
Similar patterns were found for anger. Low levels of anger were 
associated with high levels of perceived justice (b = -.14; p < .001) and 
being a tournament winner (b = -.78; p < .001) (Table 3). Furthermore, a 
significantly positive tournament winner x perceived justice interaction 
(b = -.12; p = .05) indicated that the negative effect of a system’s per-
ceived justice on anger was not valid for tournament winners. This 
might explain why winners reported on average the lowest anger levels. 
Especially for tournament winners, it now appears interesting to deter-
mine whether guilt was also related to a system’s perceived justice and 
winning the tournament. 
As observed for positive affect, no relation was found between guilt 
and the system’s perceived justice (Table 3). More specifically, signifi-
cant negative relationships between guilt and tournament winners (b = -
.56; p < .001), and guilt and equality members (b = -.37; p = .01) were 
revealed. Being a member of these groups led to lower feelings of guilt, 
whereas the system’s perceived justice and its interactions with both 
group memberships were not significant.  
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Table 3: Regressions for anger and guilt with and without interac-
tion effects 
Variable Anger Guilt 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Constant .35*** (.09) .41*** (.11) .20* (.08) .24*** (.09) 
Winner  -.56*** (.09) -.78*** (.15) -.56*** (.11) -.70*** (.16) 
Equality -.14 (.12) -.24 (.25) -.37** (13) -.49* (.28) 
Justice -.11*** (.03) -.14*** (.04) -.01 (.03) -.04 (.04) 
JusticexWinner  .12* (.06)  .09 (.07) 
JusticexEquality  .05 (.07)  .09 (.08) 
R² .09 .10 .06 .06 
ΔR² .09 .01 .06 .00 
 
F(3,434) = 
15.50,  
p < .001 
F(2,432) = 
1.98,  
p = .14 
F(3,434) = 
8.53,  
p < .001 
F(2,432) = 
.69,  
p = .50 
Note. ***p<.001; **p<.01;*p<.05 b = Regression coefficients; SE = Heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard error; Reference group = Tournament loser; Winner = Dummy-
variable for tournament winner; Equality = Dummy-variable for equality member. 
 
 
2.4 Discussion 
We argued that perceived justice, outcomes, and income inequali-
ty—all crucial factors of compensation systems—potentially influence 
people’s affects and emotions (Colquitt et al., 2013; Gallo & Matthews, 
2003; Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000). Therefore, we compared compen-
sation systems that fundamentally differed in these factors. The tour-
nament system led to very high or no payments, creating substantial 
inequality, whereas the equality system led to moderate but equal pay-
ments. 
Based on theoretical and empirical evidence (Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 
2012; Schlösser & Fetchenhauer, 2015), we assumed that the equality 
system would be perceived as more just than the tournament system, 
which was supported by our results. Additionally, we found further evi-
dence indicating that justice perceptions in the implemented tourna-
ment system are not influenced by egocentric bias (Greenberg, 1983) 
because justice ratings were equally low for winners and losers.  
32 
 
Regarding the affective and emotional consequences of compensa-
tion systems, we refrained from postulating classical hypotheses. In-
stead, we decided to construct and present two competing scenarios. At 
first sight, this approach might seem unusual, but we believed that re-
search and theory provided good reasons for both scenarios—a minor 
and a major influence of justice perceptions on affective and emotional 
experiences. Hence, empirics should decide which scenario should be 
preferred. 
In general, our results supported the view that affective experiences 
were only slightly influenced by justice perceptions. For instance, tour-
nament winners experienced the most positive affect among all partici-
pants, regardless of the system’s perceived justice, whereas most nega-
tive affect was felt among tournament losers. Losers reported signifi-
cantly more negative affect than winners and differed from the equality 
members in the assumed direction. How bad tournament losers really 
felt is revealed by examining anger and guilt. As assumed, tournament 
losers reported the highest level of anger among the participants; how-
ever, interestingly, they also felt the guiltiest. Of the considered affects 
and emotions, only negative affect and anger were related to a system’s 
perceived justice with lower justice leading to higher negative emotions 
in general and more anger in particular. However, on average, tourna-
ment winners showed the least negative affect of all participants, 
formed an exception from the relationship between a system’s perceived 
justice and anger, and apparently saw no reason to feel guilty or blame 
themselves for the negative consequences of the system.  
In sum, the three analyzed groups differed in every regarded affect 
and emotion to some extent. Focusing on affective and emotional expe-
riences, differences appeared to be largest for positive affect. Focusing 
on groups, differences were largest between tournament winners and 
losers. Therefore, the fact that both groups perceived the tournament 
system to be unjust had little influence on their affects and emotions.  
Particular attention should be paid to the reported findings for 
guilt. At first, it appears surprising that tournament losers felt guiltier 
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than winners; however, one possible explanation may be provided by 
the relation between status and perceived accountability. It was found 
that high-status individuals are likely to feel accountable for positive 
events, whereas low-status individuals feel accountable for negative 
events (Tiedens et al., 2000). This may cause different emotional re-
sponses to the same incident, and guilt may occur when a person is 
confronted with a negative outcome he or she feels accountable for 
(Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Consequently, 
low-status individuals facing negative outcomes presumably feel guilty 
(Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Moskowitz, 1998, as cited in Tiedens et al., 
2000). Hence, low-status tournament losers may blame themselves for 
their negative outcome and feel guilty, while high-status tournament 
winners might emotionally ignore injustice as they do not feel account-
able for the systems negative consequences (Festinger, 1957). In sum-
mary, our results support the view that in compensation systems which 
are not self-chosen, the system’s perceived justice only negligibly affects 
affective experiences because of missing cognitive dissonance. 
However, justice might affect emotions in compensation systems in 
another way. Hegtvedt and Killian (1999) examined fairness judgments 
(fairness and justice used interchangeably) concerning negotiations and 
discovered that perceived fairness to the self (the fairness evaluation of 
their own outcome) is crucial for people’s emotions. Interestingly, 
Schlösser and Fetchenhauer (2015) found that tournament winners 
perceived their own outcome as just right independent of the fact that 
they perceived their system to be unjust. Hence, the emotions of tour-
nament winners might be affected by positive justice evaluation of their 
personal outcome.  
2.4.1 Practical implications 
This study yields insights into the affective consequences of com-
pensation and bonus systems. Compared to tournament systems, 
equality systems appear to have neither a strong positive nor a strong 
negative effect on people's emotions. Equality members experienced 
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more positive affect than tournament losers but not as much as tour-
nament winners. Furthermore, equality members did not differ from 
tournament winners with respect to negative affect and guilt. Therefore, 
equal compensation as explored in our experiment might be considered 
neutral regarding its emotional consequences. However, one has to be 
cautious in generalizing this result. If performance is easily observable 
for all involved parties, one might think of above-average performers in 
the equality system as the system’s losers and of below-average per-
formers as the system’s winners. As a consequence, perceptions of the 
system’s justice might decrease plus the system’s effect on affective and 
emotional experiences might change. 
The applied tournament system appears to strongly influence its 
members’ emotions. Generally, organizations should benefit from the 
positive affect of tournament winners because positive affect and the 
associated positive emotions are related to desirable workplace behavior 
(Miner & Glomb, 2010; Staw et al., 1994). Additionally, affect and emo-
tion are said to be crucial for motivated behavior. Positive affect and es-
pecially pride should motivate people to repeat the high performance 
that was necessary to achieve it (Weiner, 2014; Weiss & Cropanzano, 
1996). 
Nevertheless, by their nature, tournament systems regularly create 
more losers than winners. Hence, these systems may leave most mem-
bers with negative affect, anger, and guilt. From a motivational perspec-
tive, this could either motivate people to try harder if they think that 
they did not try hard enough the first time or to resign if they got the 
impression that additional effort will not change the outcome (Weiner, 
2014). Further, especially anger was shown to foster unwanted behav-
ior, such as workplace deviance (Lee & Allen, 2002). Additionally, we 
found that tournament-like structures were perceived as unjust by all 
concerned persons and applied science has shown that injustice was 
associated with negative consequences, such as counterproductive 
workplace behavior (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001).  
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2.4.2 Limitations and future research 
This study has some noteworthy limitations. First, one may criti-
cize that we did not apply prospective power testing to determine the 
sample size for our experiment. However, to assure sufficient statistical 
power, we planned to investigate a relatively large sample (originally 448 
participants) as statistical power increases with sample size. Further-
more, we decided against observed power analysis as its additional ben-
efit has been questioned in recent years (Sun, Pan, & Wang, 2011).  
Second, one may be concerned about the external validity of the 
conducted laboratory experiment and student sample. However, this 
setting gave us the opportunity to randomly assign our participants to 
the compensation systems, ruling out alternative explanations for our 
findings. Additionally, it enabled us to control for various possible con-
founding variables and allowed us to work without first surveying base-
line emotions. Laboratory experiments are commonly applied in organi-
zational justice research (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et 
al., 2013) and were argued to be especially useful to answer questions 
about the antecedents and consequences of organizational justice (Van 
den Bos, 2001). Future research should nevertheless explore emotional 
and affective reactions to compensation in more applied settings and 
field studies.  
Third, especially winner-take-all tournament compensation in its 
pure form might be rarely applied by companies. The compensation sys-
tems compared in this study were chosen because they represent the 
extremes of equal and unequal compensation and are therefore believed 
to be well-suitable for a first comparison of affective and emotional ex-
periences in such compensation systems. Arguably other compensa-
tions systems may influence perceived justice, affect, and emotions dif-
ferently. Hence, other types of compensation, such as equity, bonus, or 
minimum wage systems, should be considered by future research as 
well.  
Fourth, we assumed accountability to be a key factor for emotions 
and consequently for affective states in compensation systems but did 
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not directly measure it. However, we deliberately designed the experi-
ment in a way that people were not accountable for the applied com-
pensation systems, because we believe this circumstance to be con-
sistent with reality. University professors, investment bankers, head 
physicians and many others might be seen as profiteers of a compensa-
tion system they did not create themselves, just like the tournament 
winners in the reported experiment. Our results seem to fit the cited 
literature on the consequences of existing and non-existing accountabil-
ity very well, which is why we are confident about the pictured relation-
ship. Nevertheless, future research should test whether accountability 
really is the crucial concept that we assumed it to be. 
2.4.3 Conclusion 
Our results suggest that equal compensation is viewed as more just 
than tournament compensation; however, the influence of a system’s 
perceived justice on people’s emotions is small. A likely explanation for 
the irrelevance of justice judgments in compensation systems shown 
here is that people do not experience cognitive dissonance because they 
do not feel accountable for the negative consequences of an implement-
ed compensation system. Hence, people who profit from systems, such 
as the tournament system, and who are aware of its injustice may claim 
the right to feel good by thinking; “It’s a shame, but I’m not to blame”. 
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3 How justice sensitivity predicts equality preferences in simu-
lated democratic systems 
3.1 Introduction 
The past three decades witnessed rising levels of income and 
wealth inequality (hereafter economic inequality) in various democratic 
societies (e.g., Alvardo et al., 2013; Atkinson et al., 2013; Cingano, 
2014; Davies et al., 2009; Keister, 2014). This development might be 
surprising because in democracies the people, who were revealed to 
have the tendency to prefer low inequality (e.g., Dawes et al., 2007; Lotz 
& Fetchenhauer, 2012; Norton & Ariely, 2011), ultimately determine the 
society’s level of inequality. Scholars have argued that these equality 
preferences might be based on justice concerns, as equality is positively 
linked to justice perceptions, which greatly influence human decision-
making (Bolton & Ockenfels, 1999; Deutsch, 1975; Fehr & Schmidt, 
2000; Norton & Ariely, 2011). 
However, especially with regard to the distribution of income and 
wealth, choosing the seemingly just option may not be consistent with a 
person’s self-interest. If and how justice issues eventually influence de-
cisions given such a personal dilemma may depend on a person’s sensi-
tivity towards violations of justice (Lovas & Wolt, 2002). This justice 
sensitivity (JS) has been found to be a stable human trait that captures 
individual differences in how easily violations of justice are perceived 
and how strong reactions to such violations are (Schmitt, Baumert, 
Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010). The degree of JS has been found to affect 
political participation (Rothmund, Baumert, & Zinkernagel, 2014), to 
predict prosocial behavior (Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Gollwitzer, 
Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005; Lotz, Baumert, Schlösser, 
Gresser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011), and to mitigate the influence of self-
interest on people’s behavior (Lotz, Schlösser, Cain, & Fetchenhauer, 
2013). 
Based on these findings, this paper, to the best of our knowledge, 
is the first to experimentally investigate the association between JS and 
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people’s preferences with regard to economic disparities in democratic 
decision-making processes. Because justice concerns were assumed to 
influence equality preferences and the intensity and consequences of 
justice perceptions depend on a person’s individual level of JS, we as-
sume that JS is able to explain individual differences in equality prefer-
ences. 
3.1.1 Attitudes towards social inequality 
In democracies, citizens—either directly or through representa-
tives—decide on distributional policy that affects and eventually deter-
mines economic inequality. However, to decide on the (re)distribution of 
resources people—and thus voters—do not only rely on self-interest but 
also apply certain principles of justice (Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975). 
Although people choose the justice principle with which they actually 
evaluate a distribution depending on situational factors (Bediou et al., 
2012) and personal preferences (Cappelen, Hole, Sorensen, & 
Tungodden, 2007), recent research has shown remarkable consensus 
regarding the just distribution of societal wealth. Without knowing 
about their position in a hypothetical society’s social hierarchy, people, 
irrespective of socio-demographical factors (e.g., wealth and political 
preferences) were found to prefer a low level of wealth inequality, which 
is seemingly perceived as more just (Norton & Ariely, 2011). 
However, not knowing about their position in a societal hierarchy 
removes self-interest from the decision-making process and thus lacks 
external validity with regard to political decisions on wealth distribu-
tion. The welfare state game, which aims to reproduce the functionality 
of a welfare state in an experimental setting, addresses this shortcom-
ing (Biniossek & Fetchenhauer, 2007; Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012). In 
this behavioral paradigm, participants are randomly labeled Person A, 
Person B, or Person C in a simulated society. Their task is to decide 
democratically or via random dictatorship between two alternative 
wealth distributions, thus determining their final monetary outcomes. 
Alternative 1 presents a relatively equal distribution and, for example, 
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entitles Person A to receive an outcome slightly above the outcome of 
Person B, who in turn is entitled to receive an outcome slightly above 
that of Person C. Alternative 2 presents a relatively unequal distribu-
tion, though more societal wealth overall and entitles Person A and Per-
son B to better outcomes than Alternative 1. However, Person C receives 
even less money in Alternative 2 than in Alternative 1. 
When compared to those in regular welfare states, Persons A re-
semble the society’s upper class (hereafter upper-class participants), 
which, irrespective of the eventually chosen alternative, is better off 
than the others but remains financially interested in high inequality. 
Persons B resemble the middle class (hereafter middle-class partici-
pants), which always receives the intermediate outcome and holds some 
financial interest in high inequality. Persons C resemble the lower class 
(hereafter lower-class participants), which receives the worst outcomes 
and is financially interested in low inequality. Finally, the difference in 
total societal wealth between Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 accounts 
for efficiency losses via redistribution in welfare states that foster high 
levels of equality (Biniossek & Fetchenhauer, 2007; Lotz & 
Fetchenhauer, 2012). 
The results obtained from the welfare state game indicated that 
low inequality is commonly considered the just choice (Lotz & 
Fetchenhauer, 2012), yet the participants’ preferred degrees of inequali-
ty depended on their societal position. Lower-class participants almost 
exclusively opted for low inequality (Biniossek & Fetchenhauer, 2007; 
Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012), whereas in prior research majorities 
(Biniossek & Fetchenhauer, 2007), respectively one-half of upper- and 
middle-class participants (Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012), opted for high 
inequality.  
Nevertheless, in total, participants predominantly voted for the 
implementation of a low-inequality society and substantial proportions 
of upper- and middle-class participants were willing to forgo a potential-
ly higher payoff to do so (Biniossek & Fetchenhauer, 2007; Lotz & 
Fetchenhauer, 2012). Additionally, persons who were not affected by 
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the distributional alternatives were found to show the same behavioral 
pattern as lower-class participants, thus further supporting the notion 
that low inequality is commonly considered fairer than and preferred to 
high inequality (Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012). Similar preferences for low 
degrees of economic inequality were found in a variety of game theory 
paradigms (see for example Camerer, 2003) and justice concerns were 
argued to influence these preferences (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr 
& Schmidt, 1999).  
In summary, these results support the notion that low inequality 
is perceived as more just and is preferred to high inequality. However, 
particularly the reported behavior of upper- and middle-class partici-
pants in the welfare state game illustrates the potential dilemma that 
people face when they have to decide between justice and self-interest. 
In this conflict, the crucial determinant of a person’s eventual decision 
to promote an equal or unequal societal wealth distribution is likely to 
be the degree to which justice matters to him or her on a personal level. 
3.1.2 The other-oriented and self-oriented side of JS 
JS is a personality trait that captures individual differences in 
how easily a violation of justice is perceived and how strong the reac-
tions to such violations are (Huseman, Hatfiled, & Miles, 1987; Lovas & 
Wolt, 2002). Thus, JS considers that every justice violation can be per-
ceived from different perspectives and differentiates between injustices 
from the perspective of the victim (JSvictim), from the perspective of the 
active perpetrator (JSperpetrator), from the perspective of the passive bene-
ficiary (JSbeneficiary), and from the perspective of the unaffected observer 
(JSobserver) (Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer, 1990; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & 
Arbach, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2010). These perspectives are related to 
one another and believed to share a general concern for justice 
(Baumert et al., 2014; Schmitt et al., 2005; Schmitt et al., 2010). How-
ever, JSvictim seems to be in clear contrast to the other perspectives. 
JS and other-related justice concerns. JSperpetrator, JSbeneficiary, and 
JSobserver  are usually highly correlated with one another (Baumert et al., 
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2014; Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Schmitt et al., 1997; Schmitt et 
al., 2010), which is why previous research has regularly combined them 
into a single JS perspective (Edele, Dziobek, & Keller, 2013; 
Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Lotz et al., 2011; Lotz et al., 2013). The 
combined perspective is referred to as others-related sensitivity (JSothers) 
because the common denominator of these perspectives is argued to 
capture justice concerns related to other people. For instance, JSobserver 
and JSbeneficiary1 are positively correlated with personality traits that ex-
press other-related concerns, such as role taking, empathy, and social 
responsibility (Schmitt et al., 2005). Moreover, JSbeneficiary was found to 
positively relate to existential guilt, social responsibility, and solidarity 
towards a victim of injustice (Gollwitzer et al., 2005); all three perspec-
tives positively relate to modesty and tender-mindedness as facets of 
agreeableness (Schmitt et al., 2010).  
However, persons scoring high on JSperpetrator, JSbeneficiary, and 
JSobserver not only care about the injustices that befall others, but also 
show behavior indicating that they are willing to indemnify or prevent 
these injustices. For instance, people who score high on JSobserver and 
JSbeneficiary are more willing to help others at their own costs (Schmitt, 
1998), and observer-sensitive persons show more political engagement 
for the common good (Rothmund et al., 2014).  
Recently, research employing economic games found that 
JSperpetrator, JSbeneficiary, JSobserver, and JSothers promoted cooperation 
(Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Gollwitzer et al., 2009) and linked 
JSothers to altruistic behavior (Edele et al., 2013; Lotz et al., 2011; Lotz et 
al., 2013). For instance, Lotz and colleagues (2013) applied JSothers to 
distinguish between reluctant and stable altruists. The authors de-
signed an experiment based on three variations of the dictator game, 
which differed in terms of the difficulty of behaving selfishly. They found 
that participants who scored high on JSothers displayed stable altruism 
in all dictator game variations. By contrast, among the participants who 
obtained low JSothers’ scores, other-regarding preferences depended on 
                                                 
1 Early studies refer to JSbeneficiary as JSperpetrator 
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the difficulty of selfish behavior. Hence, JSothers presumably mitigates 
the impact of self-interest in the context of prosocial behavior. 
In summary, the reviewed literature strongly emphasizes the as-
sumption that JSperpetrator, JSbeneficiary, JSobserver, and JSothers capture con-
cerns for the just treatment of others and that they are related to 
prosocial behavior that aims to assure global justice and to prevent and 
compensate for injustices. 
JS and self-related justice concerns. By contrast, JSvictim appears 
to primarily capture justice concerns for oneself. Early studies found 
that JSvictim relates to the experience of anger and decreased well-being 
due to unjust treatment (Mohiyeddini & Schmitt, 1997; Schmitt & 
Dörfel, 1999). However, these emotional reactions seem to be limited to 
injustices that affect victim-sensitive persons themselves.  
People with high JSvictim scores seem to care about justice but also 
hold the general belief that the world is an unjust place (Schmitt et al., 
2005). Consequently, they show egoistic and selfish tendencies to try to 
minimize their own risk of being exploited by others (Gollwitzer et al., 
2005; Gollwitzer & Rothmund, 2009; Gollwitzer & Rothmund, 2011; 
Gollwitzer, Rothmund, Pfeiffer, & Ensbach, 2009; Gollwitzer, 
Rothmund, & Süßenbach, 2013). This assumption is supported by re-
search findings that indicate that JSvictim is negatively related to inter-
personal trust and positively related to personality traits that express 
self-related concerns, such as vengeance and jealousy (Schmitt et al., 
2005).  
In line with these findings, behavioral research has found that 
victim-sensitive persons do not feel responsible for helping others over-
come unjust disadvantages (Gollwitzer et al., 2005; Schmitt, 1998); they 
even show a willingness to disregard norms if such disregard will bene-
fit them personally (Gollwitzer et al., 2005). In economic games victim-
sensitive persons were found to behave less cooperatively, even exploit-
ing others if the opportunity arose (Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; 
Gollwitzer et al., 2009; Lotz et al., 2013). In summary, the presented 
results indicate that victim-sensitive persons primarily care about not 
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becoming disadvantaged themselves and show selfish, antisocial behav-
ior towards others. 
3.1.3 Hypotheses 
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the association be-
tween JS and equality preferences in a democratic context. Therefore, 
we employ a version of the previously introduced welfare state game to 
evaluate our participants’ equality preferences. The participants demo-
cratically decided to implement either a low or a high degree of inequali-
ty, where upper- and middle-class participants could be assumed to 
have a financial interest in a high inequality system and lower-class 
participants could be assumed to have a financial interest in a low ine-
quality system. With regard to JS, the present study focuses on JSvictim 
and JSothers. From the reviewed literature, we derive the following hy-
potheses:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Most of our participants prefer a society with a 
low degree of inequality to a society with a high degree of inequality. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The preferred degree of inequality depends on a 
participant’s position in the society’s social hierarchy. The vast majority 
of lower-class participants vote for low inequality, whereas smaller 
shares of upper- and middle-class participants vote for low inequality.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The participants with high JSothers scores hold 
genuine justice concerns that are to a certain degree immune against 
self-interest. Hence, the higher participants’ JSothers scores, the less like-
ly they are to vote for the implementation of a high degree of inequality. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The participants with high JSvictim scores are 
more likely to pursue their self-interests than participants with low 
JSvictim’ scores. Hence, upper- and middle-class participants with high 
JSvictim scores are more likely to vote for a high degree of wealth inequal-
ity, whereas lower-class participants with high JSvictim scores are less 
likely to vote for a high degree of income inequality. 
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3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Sample 
Our participants were recruited on the campus of a large German 
university. Altogether, 342 completed all parts of the experiment. Sub-
sequently, 18 participants were excluded from the analysis because of 
the experimenters’ mistakes (n = 11), incorrectly answered control ques-
tions (n = 3), or missing values in one of our dependent or independent 
variables (n = 4), leaving an adjusted sample of 324 participants (60% 
females). All participants were informed that the study would take ap-
proximately 40 minutes in total and that the decisions in the second 
part would have real monetary consequences. 
3.2.2 Procedure 
Part 1. As soon as participants agreed to join the study, they were 
provided with a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. After generating a per-
sonal password, which enabled us to anonymously merge the data from 
Part 1 and Part 2, the questionnaire focused on measuring JS.  
JSothers and JSvictim were surveyed with the 8-item measure from 
Baumert and colleagues (2014). JSvictim (α = .62, M = 4.23, SD = 1.28) 
was measured using a two-item scale (e.g., “It makes me angry when 
others are undeservingly better off than me”), whereas JSothers (α = .68, M 
= 4.65, SD = 1.05) was computed by merging the scales for JSbeneficiary (α 
= .81), JSperpetrator (α = .71), and JSobserver (α = .67) (e.g., Lotz et al., 2013), 
all three of which consisted of two items (e.g. “I feel guilty when I am 
better off than others for no reason”). All items ranged from 1 (absolutely 
disagree) to 7 (absolutely agree). After providing socio-demographic in-
formation, the participants finished the first part of the study and 
scheduled an appointment for their participation in the second part 
which usually took place one week later. 
Part 2. The second part of our experiment consisted of a version of 
the presented welfare state game, which we employed to evaluate the 
participants’ distributional preferences. In each session for Part 2, be-
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tween 6 and 15 participants2 were welcomed to our laboratory, random-
ly seated, and informed that they would anonymously interact in ran-
domly chosen groups of three throughout the entire experiment. 
Each group represented a fictive society, and participants were 
randomly assigned to the role of an upper-, middle-, or lower-class par-
ticipant (neutrally labeled Person A, B, or C). After learning about their 
actual position in this simulated society, our participants had to deter-
mine their society’s level of inequality by democratically electing one of 
two alternatives (Alternative 1 and Alternative 2).  
Alternative 1 represented a society with a relatively low degree of 
inequality (A = €5; B = €4; C = €3), which might be compared to societal 
conditions in the Nordic countries (Gini Alternative 1 = .273; Gini Fin-
land in 2012 = .278). Alternative 2 represented a society with a relative-
ly high degree of inequality (A = €10; B = €6; C = €1) but higher overall 
societal wealth; therefore, it might be compared to the US (Gini Alterna-
tive 2 = .427; Gini US in 2013 = .411). Please note that the relative 
overall wealth differences between the two alternatives are also compa-
rable to gross domestic product per capita (GDP) differences between 
Finland and the US, as both differ by approximately 40% (OECD, 2015; 
World Bank, 2015). 
Before the participants were informed about their assignments as 
Person A, B, or C, control questions were asked to detect those who did 
not fully understand the paradigm. Finally, the participants opted for 
their preferred degree of inequality by voting for either Alternative 1 or 
Alternative 2. An experimenter collected the three votes and shortly 
thereafter distributed another questionnaire that contained the group’s 
democratic decision (the majority vote determined the applied alterna-
tive), the consequent payoff for the participant, and some final socio-
demographic questions. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Please note that the number of participants participating in a session did not influ-
ence voting, χ² (3, N = 324) = .79, p = .85. 
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Table 4: Voting behavior of the participants 
Vote Total Upper class Middle class Lower class 
Low inequality 57% 41% 42% 89% 
High inequality 43% 59% 59% 11% 
Notes. Percentages are based on 324 participants with 108 upper class participants, 
 106 middle class participants and 110 lower class participants. 
3.3 Results 
In the first part of our results section, we determine the partici-
pants’ equality preferences by investigating the results of the welfare 
state game. In our first hypothesis, we expected an overall preference 
for a low degree of inequality in a society. Our results support this as-
sumption. Table 4 reports the percentages of participants who voted for 
low inequality and high inequality. A binomial test indicated that a ma-
jority (57%) of the participants voted for low inequality (p = .009, two-
sided). Hence, we find that most of our participants preferred the lower 
degree of inequality. However, did a participant’s societal class influence 
these distributional preferences? 
In our second hypothesis, we assumed that lower-class partici-
pants would show stronger preferences for a low degree of inequality 
than upper- and middle-class participants. Our findings also support 
this assumption. Columns 2–4 of Table 4 show that a participant’s posi-
tion within his or her society affected his or her vote, χ² (2, N = 324) = 
68.39, p < .001. Although notable proportions of the upper- (41%) and 
middle-class (42%) participants opted for low inequality, most upper- 
and middle-class participants decided to vote for a high degree of ine-
quality. By contrast, high inequality was only voted for by a minority 
(11%) of lower-class participants, who almost exclusively opted for the 
low inequality alternative. Hence, we find clear support for our second 
hypothesis. 
As a result of the majority vote, 61% of the participants were ulti-
mately compensated based on the low inequality alternative, and 39% 
were compensated based on the high inequality alternative.  
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Figure 7: Average JSothers scores for upper-class participants, mid-
dle-class participants, and lower-class participants who either vot-
ed for a low degree of inequality or a high degree of inequality 
 
Note. Vote equal = vote for a low degree of inequality, vote unequal = vote for a high 
degree of inequality. 
In the second part of our results section, we investigate the main 
research interest of this study, i.e., the connection between distribu-
tional preferences and JS, in two steps. In the first step, we investigate 
the connection between JSothers and equality preferences, followed by a 
similar investigation of the connection between JSvictim and equality 
preferences. In these analyses we controlled for JSvictim respectively 
JSothers, which were positively correlated with each other, r = .22, p < 
.001. The presented findings result from binary logistic regression mod-
els calculated with a bootstrapping mechanism employing 3000 re-
samples and bias-corrected and accelerated standard errors, with the 
vote (0 = vote for a low degree of inequality; 1 = vote for a high degree of 
inequality) as dependent variable.  
In our third hypothesis, we assumed other-sensitive persons in all 
classes to prefer a low degree of inequality. More specifically, other-
sensitive participants would be less likely to vote for the high inequality 
alternative in the welfare state game. Our first results suggest that this 
hypothesis holds. Figure 7 shows that, in all classes, the participants 
who voted for a low degree of inequality had higher JSothers scores than 
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those who voted for a high degree of inequality. This pattern is under-
lined by the results of the logistic regression models reported in Table 5. 
Models 1–4 find that the higher the participants’ JSothers scores, the less 
likely they were to vote for a high degree of inequality, irrespective of 
whether we did (Models 2-4) or did not (Model 1) control for a partici-
pant’s class affiliation. 
Although Figure 7 appears to suggest that the effect of JSothers on 
distributional preferences is stronger for upper-class participants, fur-
ther analysis reveals the effect of JSothers to be similar in all the classes. 
Models 5-7 in Table 5 show that no interaction effects emerged between 
JSothers and class affiliation and that including such interactions did not 
improve the models, χ² (2, N = 324) = 3.27, p = .20. Hence, in support of 
our third hypothesis, we find that the higher our participants’ JSothers 
scores, the less likely they were to vote for high inequality, irrespective 
of their position in society. 
 Table 5: OLS regression models for the influence of JSothers and class affiliation on voting controlling for JSvictim 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Constant .05 
(.52) 
.97 
(.71) 
.95 
(.75) 
-1.52* 
(.79) 
2.30* 
(1.05) 
-.01 
(.89) 
-1.76 
(1.90) 
JSvictim  .23* 
(.10) 
.21 
(.11) 
.21* 
(.11) 
.21* 
(.11) 
.21 
(.10) 
.21* 
(.10) 
.21* 
(.11) 
JSothers -.29** 
(.11) 
-.32* 
(.13) 
-.32* 
(.14) 
-.32* 
(.13) 
-.60** 
(.21) 
-.12 
(.18) 
-.27 
(.41) 
Upper class 
  
.02 
(.29) 
2.49*** 
(.40) 
 2.31 
(1.32) 
4.06* 
(2.19) 
Middle class 
 
-.02 
(.29) 
 2.46*** 
(.41) 
-2.31 
(1.32) 
 1.75 
(2.06) 
Lower class 
 
-2.49*** 
(.40) 
-2.46*** 
(.40)  
-4.06* 
(1.75) 
-1.75 
(1.66) 
 
Upper class x JSothers 
  
 
 
 -.49 
(.27) 
-.34 
(.47) 
Middle class x JSothers 
  
 
 
.49 
(.27) 
 .15 
(.44) 
Lower class x JSothers 
  
 
 
.34 
(.37) 
-.15 
(.18) 
 
Nagelkerke r² .04** .31*** .31*** .31*** .32*** .32*** .32*** 
Δ χ² 10.43* 74.89*** 74.89*** 74.89*** 3.27 3.27 3.27 
Notes: Upper class, middle class, and lower class are dummy variables coded in a way that 1 represents the respective feature. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. 
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Figure 8: Average JSvictim scores for upper-class participants, mid-
dle-class participants, and lower-class participants who either vot-
ed for a low degree of inequality or a high degree of inequality 
 
Note. Vote equal = vote for a low degree of inequality, vote unequal = vote for a high 
 degree of inequality. 
In our fourth and final hypothesis, we assumed that victim-
sensitive participants would follow their self-interests, which would 
have led victim-sensitive upper- and middle-class participants to vote 
for high inequality and victim-sensitive lower-class participants to vote 
for low inequality. In line with these assumptions, Figure 8 shows that 
upper- and middle-class participants who voted for a high degree of in-
equality had, on average, higher JSvictim scores than their counterparts, 
whereas in the lower class those who voted for a low degree of inequality 
had higher JSvictim scores.  
This first visual impression of the connection between JSvictim and 
equality preferences received further support from the results of our lo-
gistic regression analysis. Table 6 shows that the effect of JSvictim on vot-
ing depended on the class with which a participant was affiliated. Model 
5 and Model 6 reveal a coherent positive effect of JSvictim on voting for 
upper- and middle-class participants indicating that the higher these 
participants’ JSvictim scores, the more likely they were to vote for high 
inequality. This effect is found to be significant for middle-class partici-
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pants (b = -.42, p = .009), whereas it is marginally significant for upper 
class participants, b = .31, p = .06.  
By contrast, Model 7 in Table 6 reveals that JSvictim influences be-
havior among lower-class participants differently. In particular, upper- 
(b = .89, p = .004) and middle-class (b = 1.00, p = .001) participants 
who had high JSvictim scores were more likely to vote for a high degree of 
inequality than lower-class participants who had high JSvictim scores. In 
fact, lower-class participants with high JSvictim scores were significantly 
less likely to vote for the high inequality alternative, b = -.58, p = .03. 
Therefore, in line with our hypotheses, the higher our participants’ 
JSothers scores, the more likely they were to vote for a low degree of ine-
quality, whereas the higher our participants’ JSvictim scores the more 
likely they were to follow their self-interests. 
 Table 6: OLS regression models for the influence of JSvictim and class affiliation on voting controlling for JSothers 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Constant .05 
(.60) 
.97 
(.72) 
.95 
(.76) 
-1.52* 
(.79) 
.61 
(.91) 
.13 
(.93) 
1.59 
(1.25) 
JSothers -.29* 
(.12) 
-.32* 
(.13) 
-.32* 
(.14) 
-.32* 
(.13) 
-.34* 
.(14) 
-.34* 
(.14) 
-.34* 
(.14) 
JSvictim .23* 
(.10) 
.21* 
(.11) 
.21* 
(.11) 
.21* 
(.11) 
.31 
(.17) 
.42** 
(.17) 
-.58* 
(.35) 
Upper class 
  
.02 
(.29) 
2.49*** 
(.40) 
 
 
.48 
(.64) 
-.97 
(1.40) 
Middle class 
 
-.02 
(.28) 
 2.46*** 
(.41) 
-.48 
(1.08) 
 -1.45 
(1.39) 
Lower class 
 
-2.49*** 
(.40) 
-2.46*** 
(.40)  
.97 
(1.40) 
1.45 
(1.39) 
 
 
Upper class x JSvictim 
  
 
 
 -.11 
(.24) 
.89** 
(.39) 
Middle class x JSvictim 
  
 
 
.11 
(.24) 
 1.02** 
(.38) 
Lower class x JSvictim 
  
 
 
-.89** 
(.40) 
-1.00 
(.38) 
 
 
Nagelkerke r² .04** .31*** .31*** .31*** .35*** .35*** .35*** 
Δ χ² 10.43** 74.89*** 74.89*** 74.89*** 11.51** 11.51** 11.51** 
Notes: Upper class, middle class, and lower class are dummy variables coded in a way that 1 represents the respective feature. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. 
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3.4 Discussion 
This research aimed to investigate whether individual differences in 
equality preferences can be explained by a justice-oriented personality 
trait—namely, justice sensitivity. In particular, we focused on the jus-
tice sensitivity perspectives of other-related sensitivity in contrast to vic-
tim sensitivity and employed the welfare state game to survey equality 
preferences in a democratic system.  
With regard to equality preferences, the presented results provide 
unfettered support for our hypotheses and confirm predictions based on 
the reviewed literature. In line with our first hypothesis, we found that 
most participants voted to implement a low degree of inequality. Howev-
er, voting behavior in the welfare state game strongly depended on a 
participant’s personal position within a fictive society. In accordance 
with our second hypothesis, the overwhelming majority of lower-class 
participants voted for a low degree of inequality, whereas upper- and 
middle-class participants primarily voted for a higher degree of inequali-
ty. 
Nevertheless, about 40% of both upper- and middle-class partici-
pants opted for the implementation of low inequality and thus against 
their self-interest. Therefore, the observed overall preference for a socie-
ty with a relatively low degree of inequality seems to be based on the 
overwhelming support of lower-class participants and its general ac-
ceptance among all classes. Instead, a high degree of inequality is not 
an option for lower-class participants, even if it increases the society’s 
total wealth. Hence, our first results replicate previous findings in the 
welfare state game (Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012) and provide further 
support for the notion of people, all other things being equal, preferring 
low inequality (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Dawes et al., 2007; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999). 
With regard to our primary research target, the association be-
tween equality preferences in the welfare state game and JS, we based 
our argumentation on the idea that, all other things being equal, a low-
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er degree of societal inequality is considered more just than a high de-
gree of societal inequality and thus is commonly preferred (e.g., Lotz & 
Fetchenhauer, 2012; Norton & Ariely, 2011). However, if the implemen-
tation of low inequality goes against one’s self-interest, a conflict arises 
between self-interest and perceived justice, and an individual’s ultimate 
decision depends on his or her level of JS. From this line of thought, we 
derived two main hypotheses, both of which were supported by our 
findings. 
Based on research reporting that JSothers is linked to genuine jus-
tice concerns and hampers the influence of self-interest on prosocial 
decision-making, our third hypothesis assumed people with high JSothers 
scores would generally prefer low inequality. Our results supported this 
assumption—upper-, middle-, and lower-class participants alike were 
found to be more likely to vote for a low degree of inequality when they 
had high JSothers scores. This result is in line with previous findings that 
indicate other-sensitive people to be seemingly resistant to the tempta-
tion of self-interest (Lotz et al., 2013).  
Based on research reporting JSvictim to be connected to selfish be-
havior, our fourth hypothesis assumed that victim-sensitive persons 
would be more likely to pursue their self-interests. In accordance with 
our fourth hypothesis, we found that upper- and middle-class partici-
pants who had high JSvictim scores were more likely to vote for a high 
degree of inequality, whereas lower-class participants who had high 
JSvictim scores were less likely to vote for a high degree of inequality. 
Hence, in line with previous research, we found victim-sensitive persons 
to be especially concerned about themselves (e.g., Fetchenhauer & 
Huang, 2004; Gollwitzer et al., 2005; Lotz et al., 2013).  
Recent research has often argued that victim-sensitive persons be-
have in seemingly selfish ways because they think that they will fall 
prey to others’ exploitation if they do not behave selfishly (Gollwitzer et 
al., 2005; Gollwitzer et al., 2009; Gollwitzer et al., 2013; Gollwitzer & 
Rothmund, 2009; Gollwitzer & Rothmund, 2011). Interestingly, the ap-
plied welfare state game did not really allow for the exploitation of up-
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per- and middle-class participants and we still found victim-sensitive 
participants in these classes to be more likely to vote in accordance with 
their self-interest at significant (middle-class) and marginally significant 
(upper-class) levels. Hence, in line with previous research (e.g., 
Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004), our results suggest that egoistic and 
antisocial behavior among victim-sensitive persons goes even beyond 
situations in which they are objectively vulnerable to exploitation them-
selves. A possible explanation might be that victim-sensitive persons 
experienced the world to be an unjust place in which other people do 
not care about justice (Schmitt et al., 2005). Consequently, they might 
believe that people generally pursue their self-interests without consid-
ering the consequences for others and thus deduce their entitlement to 
behave in the same way. 
3.4.1 Limitations 
The results of the present study are to some extent limited; thus, 
further research is needed to account for these limitations. For in-
stance, our results were based on an experiment and might therefore 
possess limited external validity. However, although critical considera-
tion of experimental results with regard to their external validity is im-
portant, laboratory experiments generally possess the advantage of con-
trolling for unknown confounding factors. Therefore, they are particu-
larly useful in foundational research (Van den Bos, 2001) and have 
been frequently used in the field of justice research (Colquitt et al., 
2013). Nevertheless, future research could add to this topic by replicat-
ing the presented results in field and survey studies. 
Another limitation of this study is that participants in the welfare 
state game had to vote for one of only two alternative degrees of inequal-
ity. Assuming that justice sensitivity really alters behavior depending on 
of the degree of a specific justice violation, the results may differ with 
varying wealth distributions. Therefore, we decided to apply wealth dis-
tributions close to those of exemplary nations in the field of inequality 
research (US vs. Nordic nations). Furthermore, the obtained results in 
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the welfare state game strongly resemble previously described behavior-
al patterns in related research (e.g., Biniossek & Fetchenhauer, 2007; 
Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012), which leaves us confident about the ro-
bustness of our findings for a variety of distributional patterns. 
3.4.2 Conclusion 
This study adds to the comprehension of equality preferences and 
extends the scope of research in the field of justice-oriented personality 
dispositions. In line with previous research, we found evidence of a jus-
tice-related human preference for low degrees of inequality in income 
and wealth distributions. Extending the existing literature, our results 
indicate an association between individuals’ degrees of sensitivity to-
wards justice and their equality preferences. We found that people who 
had high scores on the justice sensitivity dimension of other-related jus-
tice sensitivity generally preferred low degrees of inequality in a ran-
domly composed fictive society, whereas people who had high scores on 
the victim-sensitivity dimension had no generally preferred degree of 
inequality. Instead, the distributional preferences of victim-sensitive 
persons were guided by their self-interests. Therefore, the presented 
study reveals that justice sensitivity plays an important role in the de-
termination and development of societal inequality. 
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4 The effects of democratically determined inequality on cooper-
ation: An experimental analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
In recent years, there have been controversial discussions about 
the possible association between wealth and income disparities and var-
ious undesirable societal phenomena (e.g., Saunders, 2010; Wilkinson 
& Pickett, 2009a), among them low levels of trust and cooperation, 
which have been argued to ultimately hamper economic growth (Knack 
& Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001). Although the relationship between 
inequality and cooperation has been studied extensively, experimental 
results in this area, are at first glance, contradictory and find inequality 
to have a positive, negative or no effect on cooperation (see, for example 
Anderson et al., 2008; Chan et al., 1996; Haile et al, 2008). Recent 
studies might partly explain these conflicting findings by showing that 
the origin of inequality is crucial when determining its behavioral con-
sequences (Greiner et al., 2012; Haile et al., 2008). Therefore, we aim to 
investigate a common form of societal inequality and its effect on coop-
erative behavior, i.e., inequality that results from a democratic process. 
In this paper, we explore the relationship between democratically 
induced inequality and the level of cooperation in a two-stage experi-
mental study. To access the participants’ cooperativeness, our experi-
ment incorporates a public good game. In contrast to various previous 
studies, inequality is not induced exogenously, instead, it is induced by 
employing a behavioral paradigm called the welfare state game 
(Biniossek & Fetchenhauer, 2007; Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012). In the 
welfare state game, participants are assigned to fictive social classes 
(the upper class, middle class, or lower class) and democratically decide 
whether payoffs are distributed according to the standards of an equal 
society or an unequal society (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2006; Biniossek & 
Fetchenhauer, 2007; Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012). Hence, participants 
determine their society’s level of inequality, while they know about their 
position in a society’s social hierarchy. With the help of this design, we 
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transfer the functional principle of a democratic welfare state to an ex-
perimental environment and investigate its consequences for coopera-
tive behavior. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to do so. 
Based on theoretical and empirical evidence (Lotz & 
Fetchenhauer, 2012; Norton & Ariely, 2011), we predict that most of 
these fictive societies will opt for the more equal wealth distribution. In 
line with this prediction, our results reveal an overall preference for a 
society in which wealth is distributed relatively equally with large pro-
portions of upper- and middle-class participants voting in favor of a low 
degree of inequality, even though that decision will result in financial 
losses to them.  
With regard to the main research target, i.e., cooperative behavior, 
we argue that democratically induced inequality undermines coopera-
tion, which is also supported by our results. Contributions to the public 
good are greater among groups of participants who previously opted for 
an equal society. Furthermore, we detect no evidence indicating that 
this behavior emerges because of a mechanism based on self-selection, 
similarity, risk, or inequality aversion. Comparing the participants as-
signed to different societal classes, we find that inequality decreases co-
operation, especially among middle- and lower-class participants, which 
suggests that the mechanism behind this relationship may be driven by 
motivated reasoning.  
Hereafter, this paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 4.2, we 
briefly review previous experimental research on the inequality-
cooperation relationship and people’s preferences concerning wealth 
distributions. In Chapter 4.3, we deduce our behavioral predictions and 
suggest mechanism potentially underlying the inequality-cooperation 
association. Chapter 4.4 presents the experimental design that we used 
to collect the data, which are analyzed in Chapter 4.5. The final section 
discusses our findings and presents our conclusions. 
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4.2 Previous findings 
4.2.1 Inequality and cooperation 
Previous experimental studies that target the association between 
inequality, on the one hand, and cooperation, on the other hand, indi-
cate a complex relationship by reporting inconsistent results. While 
some studies find positive effects of inequality on cooperative behavior 
(e.g., Chan et al., 1996), others find negative effects (e.g., Anderson et 
al., 2008) or no effect at all (e.g., Sadrieh & Verbon, 2006). These vary-
ing results might be partly explained by recent research suggesting that 
the origin of inequality is especially important when determining its 
eventual effect on cooperation (Greiner et al., 2012; Haile et al., 2008).  
By conducting an experiment based on a repeated trust game3, 
Greiner and colleagues (2012) find different behavioral patterns for ex-
ogenously and endogenously induced inequality. The authors report 
that trust is initially low, though relatively stable, in an exogenous ine-
quality condition, thus eventually exceeding trust in an endogenous 
condition. They ascribe the latter part of this result to the different in-
formational value of endogenous and exogenous inequality. In their ex-
periment, endogenous inequality is necessarily a consequence of previ-
ous untrustworthy behavior because all participants initially receive the 
same endowment and can only generate higher earnings than others by 
exploiting their trust. By contrast, exogenous inequality cannot be used 
to make the same deduction because the participants’ initial endow-
ments already differ, which, after a few rounds, makes it impossible to 
tell whether a participant’s considerable wealth results from a high ini-
tial endowment or untrustworthy behavior. Hence, their results suggest 
that people use the level of endogenous inequality to deduce previous 
behaviors and reduce their risk by using these insights in their deci-
sions to trust. Because trust is closely related to cooperation and has 
                                                 
3 The trust game is a behavioral paradigm created by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 
(1995), which is also called investment game. It is mainly used as a behavioral meas-
ure of trust and trustworthiness. However, as a certain amount of trust is essential for 
cooperation, inferences about cooperative behavior might be deduced from its results 
as well. 
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even previously been called “the expectation of cooperation” (Pruitt & 
Kimmel, 1977: 375), it can be assumed that decreasing levels of trust 
ultimately also lead to diminishing cooperation.  
Indeed, in a related experiment Haile et al. (2008) find that endog-
enously implemented inequality (but not exogenously implemented ine-
quality) affects cooperation in a version of the public good game. In their 
experiment, inequality either is implemented randomly or results from 
the choice of a dictator who personally benefits from higher inequality, 
as it eventually increases his or her outcome. The experimental findings 
show that inequality only influences public good contributions if it re-
sults from the choice of the dictator. In this case, higher inequality de-
creases contributions to the public good. Hence, the two presented 
studies indicate that the source of inequality is crucial in determining 
its consequences and suggest that particularly endogenous inequality 
hampers cooperation. 
Because the origin of inequality seems to be critical for its even-
tual effect on cooperation, it is surprising that a common method of pol-
icy-making and an important source of inequality has been mostly ne-
glected in experimental research, i.e., majority choices. Previous re-
search investigated the impact of democratically chosen institutions, 
such as sanctioning and rewarding mechanisms, on cooperation (see 
Balafoutas, Kocher, Putterman, & Sutter, 2013; Dal Bó, Foster, & 
Putterman, 2010; Kosfeld, Okada, & Riedl, 2009; Putterman, Tyran, & 
Kamei, 2011; Sutter, Haigner, & Kocher, 2010; Walker, Gardner, Herr, 
& Ostrom, 2000); however, to the best of our knowledge, the impact of a 
democratically chosen wealth distribution on cooperative behavior has 
yet to be explored. 
4.2.2 Democratic determination of inequality 
In democratic welfare states, policies and redistribution are ulti-
mately the result of majority decisions. For instance, voters empower 
parties that promote a flat or a progressive taxation system and thus 
select different degrees of redistribution, leading to different degrees of 
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inequality. Hence, a society’s level of inequality might be thought of as 
the result of a democratic vote.  
One factor that people are likely to consider when they decide on 
the level of inequality is their personal position in the society’s social 
hierarchy. From a merely rational perspective, it can be argued that 
people should always favor distributions that financially benefit their 
class and, in turn, themselves the most. Hence, facing the decision be-
tween a society with a low degree of inequality and a society with a high 
degree of inequality, those who financially benefit from more inequality 
should prefer the respective society and vice versa for those who benefit 
from less inequality.  
However, empirical findings have shown that a notable proportion 
of people generally value equal wealth and income distributions more 
than unequal ones (Dawes et al., 2007; Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012; 
Norton & Ariely, 2011). Recently, Norton and Ariely (2011) gave a repre-
sentative sample of US citizens the opportunity to design a society in 
which wealth is ideally distributed. The authors find that people of all 
regarded demographic groups wish for far more equal wealth distribu-
tions those observed in reality. As such, an overwhelming majority (92% 
of participants) prefers a society with a Swedish wealth distribution to a 
society with an American wealth distribution. Experimental research 
has shown that this preference for equally distributed wealth persists, 
even if more equality results in personal financial losses and less socie-
tal wealth in total (Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012). In accordance with the-
se results, scholars have argued that inequality and justice concerns 
are integrated into human decision-making, leading people to be ine-
quality averse to some degree (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000). Therefore, decisions regarding the society’s level of 
inequality should be made depending on an individual’s personal level 
of inequality aversion and his or her financial incentives. 
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4.3 Behavioral predictions 
Based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 4.2.2, we believe that 
our participants will generally prefer a wealth distribution with a lower 
degree of inequality. However, the proportion of participants who opt for 
the higher degree of equality should differ depending on their position in 
the social hierarchy. In our experiment, participants are randomly as-
signed to a fictional lower, middle or upper class. Upper- and middle-
class participants have a financial incentive to opt for an unequal socie-
ty, whereas lower-class participants have a financial incentive to opt for 
an equal society. Hence, the largest proportion of equality voters should 
be found among lower-class participants. 
Based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 4.2.1, we further as-
sume that societies that opt for a greater degree of inequality show less 
cooperative behavior. This effect may be driven by various mechanisms, 
such as the self-selection of cooperative people into the equal society, 
similarity considerations, risk considerations, inequality aversion, and 
motivated reasoning.  
First, a mechanism based on self-selection assumes that partici-
pants who vote for equality are generally more prosocial and, in turn, 
more cooperative than their counterparts (see, for example Bergh & 
Bjørnskov, 2014). If this were true, we would observe a higher level of 
cooperation among the participants who vote for equality, irrespective of 
the degree of inequality that is eventually implemented in their society. 
Second, a mechanism based on similarity considerations argues 
that people prefer cooperating with those that are to a certain degree 
similar to themselves. It has been suggested that similarity is a crucial 
component in the evolution of cooperation (Riolo, Cohen & Axelrod, 
2001), and previous research has found that perceived similarity moti-
vates cooperation in social dilemmas (Fischer, 2009). Therefore, high 
wealth inequality might emphasize dissimilarities and consequently de-
crease cooperation. However, interestingly, cooperation has been found 
to increase if individuals perceive their interaction partners to share 
their attitudes (Fischer, 2009). In the context of democratic decision-
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making, this finding suggests that people might cooperate more readily 
and more often if most people in their society share their personal atti-
tudes.  
Hence a similarity based mechanism suggests that, in a demo-
cratic system, wealth inequality should not necessarily lead to lower co-
operation, but participants who are a part of the society’s majority—
their attitude towards the appropriate degree of inequality is similar to 
the majority’s attitude towards inequality—should be especially cooper-
ative irrespective of the eventually determined level of inequality.  
Third, a mechanism based on risk considerations argues that the 
societal level of inequality acts as a proxy for previous behavior (Greiner 
et al., 2012). This mechanism implies that the democratic implementa-
tion of a political system that fosters inequality may signal previous 
selfish behavior and thereby increase the perceived risk of exploitation, 
which reduces trust and ultimately leads to decreased cooperation. 
Therefore, the mechanism predicts a decrease in the willingness to co-
operate among all members of an unequal society, as a majority of self-
ish individuals increases the general risk of cooperation.  
Fourth, a mechanism based on inequality aversion suggests that 
inequality decreases cooperation in societies as a byproduct of attempts 
to distribute wealth more equally (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000). As inequality-averse individuals are concerned not 
only about their own wealth but also about the general distribution of 
wealth within their society, they attempt to redistribute resources if 
wealth disparities surpass a certain threshold. One way to partly reallo-
cate the society’s wealth and reduce inequality is the provision of public 
goods by the rich without the contributions and, in turn, the coopera-
tion of the poor. Hence, inequality-averse individuals might regard 
wealthy individuals as responsible for the provision of public goods that 
benefit society as a whole. Interestingly, wealthy inequality-averse indi-
viduals actually should willingly relinquish a part of their wealth to re-
duce wealth disparities. Thus, the mechanism simultaneously predicts 
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an increase in the willingness to cooperate among the wealthy and a 
decrease in the willingness to cooperate among the poor.  
As in the present experiment, cooperation is measured by contri-
butions to a public good, the depicted mechanism suggests that, after 
inequality was implemented, the upper- and middle-class participants 
who benefited are willing to contribute to the public good and cooperate, 
whereas the suffering lower-class participants do not contribute. 
Finally, the underlying thought of a mechanism based on moti-
vated reasoning is that people desire to act in their own self-interest; 
however, such behavior has to be justifiable for them. This justification 
has to surpass a certain threshold of plausibility, but people’s motiva-
tion to arrive at their desired conclusion may cause them to selectively 
search their memory for beliefs and rules that may apply (Kunda, 
1990). Consequently, inequality might decrease cooperation if not coop-
erating is in the self-interest of a majority and if inequality delivers a 
plausible justification arguing that not cooperating is appropriate.  
In the present experiment, high inequality, on the one hand, ben-
efits upper-class participants the most and middle-class participants a 
little; on the other hand, lower-class participants suffer from its imple-
mentation. Hence, after inequality is implemented and participants are 
asked to cooperatively contribute to the public good, lower-class partic-
ipants might be motivated to reason that it is only fair if the previously 
benefiting middle-class and upper-class participants provide the public 
good on their own.  
However, middle-class participants might not want to contribute 
either and thus may be motivated to neglect the fact that they benefited 
from inequality. Instead, they may compare themselves with upper-
class participants and reason that the upper class benefited the most 
and should thus provide the public good on its own.  
By contrast, upper-class participants may find no sufficiently 
plausible reason why middle- or lower-class participants should con-
tribute more to the public good than they do, but they also do not want 
to be their paymasters. Hence, they might reason that the implementa-
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tion of inequality and the decision to cooperate should be perceived as 
independent of one another and arrive at the desired conclusion that 
they should behave as if the previous situation did not occur.  
Thus, because of motivated reasoning, inequality should not in-
fluence the cooperativeness of upper-class participants; however, coop-
eration among middle- and lower-class participants should decrease, 
causing an overall decrease in cooperative behavior under conditions of 
high inequality. 
The conducted experiment is probably most closely related to the 
presented study by Haile and colleagues (2008). However, our experi-
ment still differs in crucial ways. First, we do not alter the size of our 
participants’ endowments and thus do not alter their behavioral options 
in the public good game (Anderson et al., 2008). Second, our experiment 
employs a democratic vote to determine the degree of inequality instead 
of a dictatorial decision and, in turn, provides valuable insights into the 
effect of economic inequality on cooperation in democratic systems and 
the mechanisms behind it. Third, we assign our participants to a fic-
tional upper-, middle- or lower-class, which allows us to investigate 
whether the effect of inequality on cooperation does or does not depend 
on an individual’s societal status. 
4.4 Experimental Design 
After being approached on the campus of a large German universi-
ty, 342 persons agreed to participate in a study about decision-making. 
All the participants were told that the experiment included decisions 
about real monetary payoffs, yet they were not promised a specific pay-
ment amount. Seventy participants had to be excluded from the analy-
sis for reasons such as incorrect answers to control questions, incom-
plete questionnaires or experimenter mistakes, leaving an adjusted 
sample of 272 participants (60% females)4. On average participants 
earned €8.54 in approximately 30 minutes. In each session of the ex-
                                                 
4 The excluded participants do not differ significantly from the participants who stayed 
in the analysis in any of the regarded variables.  
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periment, between 6 and 15 participants interacted in randomly chosen 
and anonymous groups of three. The group composition was stable 
throughout the experiment, which was paper-and-pencil and consisted 
of two phases. 
In phase 1, we employed a welfare state game to induce inequality 
(Biniossek & Fetchenhauer, 2007; Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012). The 
participants were provided with different positions (person A, B, and C) 
and had to democratically choose between two alternatives (alternative 
1 and alternative 2). While the different positions represented different 
societal statuses (person A = upper class; person B = middle class; per-
son C = lower class), the two alternatives represented fictive societies 
(alternative 1 = equal society; alternative 2 = unequal society). Thereby, 
alternative 1 provided a relatively equal income distribution (person A = 
€5; person B = €4; person C = €3), whereas alternative 2 provided a rel-
atively unequal income distribution (person A = €10; person B = €6; 
person C = €1) yet higher societal wealth in total5. With a Gini-
coefficient of .273, alternative 1 might be compared to the Nordic coun-
tries (e.g., Gini coefficient for Finland in 2012: .278), while alternative 2 
(Gini-coefficient = .427) might be compared to the US (Gini coefficient in 
2013 = .411) (World Bank, 2015). The participants answered several 
sample questions to ensure their understanding of the paradigm and 
voted for their preferred society after being informed about their posi-
tion as person A, B, or C. An experimenter then collected and evaluated 
the votes. 
At the beginning of phase 2, the participants were told the votes of 
all members of their group, the final result of the vote, and they were 
reminded of their payment resulting from that decision. Then the ques-
tionnaire instructed participants on the public good game that we used 
to measure cooperative behavior. The participants interacted in the 
same group as in phase 1. Each participant received an endowment of 
€3 and had the opportunity to contribute every possible integer amount  
                                                 
5 We implemented higher total wealth in the unequal society to account for the effi-
ciency losses that might result from redistributing wealth in an equal society.  
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Table 7: Voting of the participants separated by class affiliation 
Vote Upper class Middle class Lower class Total 
Low inequality 40%  43% 92% 58% 
Total 60% 57% 8% 42% 
Notes. Low inequality = societies which eventually implemented a low degree of ine-
quality; high inequality = societies which eventually implemented a high degree of ine-
quality; Percentages are based on 272 participants with 91 upper-class participants, 
91 middle-class participants and 90 lower-class participants 
of this money to the public good or to keep it to himself or herself. The 
kept amount was added to the earnings of the respective participants, 
whereas the contributed amount was multiplied by 1.5 and distributed 
equally among all group members. Hence, every €1 invested increased 
the group’s total payoff by €1.50 and earned each participant €0.50 (= 
€1*1.5/3). Again, the participants had to answer control questions be-
fore they stated their final decision for how much they wanted to con-
tribute to the public good and how much they wanted to keep for them-
selves. Finally, the participants provided some socio-demographic in-
formation. 
4.5 Results 
First, we analyze the results of the democratic vote. Table 7 reports 
the voting behavior of our participants and indicates that, as expected, 
a majority (58%) preferred a society with a low degree of inequality to a 
society with a high degree of inequality; p = .009, two-sided binomial 
test. However, the table also shows that members of the classes studied 
strongly differed in their preferences, as indicated by their votes, χ² (2, N 
= 272) = 64.57, p < .001. While 92% of lower-class participants’ voted in 
favor of a low degree of inequality, only 40% of upper-class and 43% of 
middle-class participants did the same. The votes of upper- and middle-
class participants did not differ from another, χ² (1, N = 182) = .20, p = 
.65. Hence, in accordance with the assumption that particularly lower-
class participants will prefer a low degree of wealth inequality, we main-
ly attribute the overall preference for low inequality to the votes of low-
er-class participants. 
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Table 8: Number of participants separated by the degree of inequal-
ity and class affiliation 
Society Upper class 
n 
Middle class 
n 
Lower class 
n  
Total 
Low inequality 56  55 59 170 
High inequality 35  36 31 102 
Total 91 91 90 272 
Notes. Low inequality = societies which eventually implemented a low degree of ine-
quality; high inequality = societies which eventually implemented a high degree of ine- 
quality  
Table 8 reports the distribution of participants in accordance with 
their class affiliation and the degree of inequality resulting from the 
democratic vote. Overall, 62.5% of the participants were eventually 
compensated as members of an equal society and 37.5% of the partici-
pants were compensated as members of an unequal society.  
In the second step of our analysis, we want to answer the primary re-
search question about whether democratically determined inequality 
decreases cooperation. The presented results indicate that cooperation 
was indeed negatively influenced by high inequality. On average, our 
participants contributed €1.70 (SD = 1.20) to the public good and thus 
57% of their initial endowment. Figure 9 presents the average contribu-
tions to the public good separated by society (i.e., unequal society or 
equal society). In line with our prediction, the results reveal that ine-
quality was related to lower levels of cooperation. The participants 
whose groups had previously chosen an equal society contributed, on 
average, €1.89 (SD = 1.14), whereas the participants whose groups had 
previously chosen an unequal society contributed only €1.39 (SD = 
1.24); p = .001, two-sided Mann-Whitney U test. Therefore, these results 
affirm our main research hypothesis which stated that democratically 
determined inequality harms cooperation. 
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Figure 9: Public good game contributions separated by society affil-
iation 
 
In the third step of our analysis, we explore the potential mecha-
nisms on which the association between inequality and cooperation 
might be based. The first mechanism that we suggested was based on 
self-selection and argued that people with a predisposition for coopera-
tion might self-select into a society with low inequality. Analyzing the 
relationship between the participants’ votes and their contributions in 
the public good game reveals that our results do not support this mech-
anism. Table 9 provides the results of three OLS models that employ 
public good game contributions as a dependent variable. Model 1 finds 
that a participant’s vote had no general effect on his or her contribu-
tions to the public good game. Therefore, the participants who voted for 
the equal society and those who voted for the unequal society exhibited 
similar levels of cooperation. Hence, cooperation in equal societies was 
not high because people who prefer the equal society are usually more 
cooperative. 
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Table 9: OLS regression models for the influence of the own vote 
and class affiliation on public good game contributions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b (SD) b (SD) b (SD) 
Constant 1.76 (.10)*** 1.93 (.16)*** 1.86 (.20)*** 
Vote inequality -.15 (.15) -.21 (.17) -.10 (.25) 
Middle class  -.21 (.18) .11 (.27) 
Lower class  -.21 (.20) -.24 (.24) 
Vote inequality x  
middle class   -.55 (.36) 
Vote inequality x  
lower class   1.04 (.53)* 
R² .004 .01 .04* 
Δ R² .004 .006 .03** 
Notes: Vote inequality is a dummy variable with 1 representing a vote for a high degree 
of inequality, middle class and lower class are dummy variables coded in a way that 1 
represents the respective feature. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. 
This result remains robust when we control for the influence of 
class affiliation on contributions using the upper class as the reference 
group (model 2). We find that neither membership in the middle class or 
lower class nor votes were associated with changes in cooperative be-
havior. In addition, by analyzing how voting interacted with class affilia-
tion (model 3), we find no evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
equality-preferring individuals were more cooperative. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that lower-class participants who voted for the unequal 
society cooperated even more than the reference group. Their contribu-
tions to the public good exceeded those of upper-class participants who 
voted for the equality system by, on average, €1.04. At first glance, this 
behavior might be perceived as counterintuitive; however, one might 
simply regard this group as social output maximizers. With their initial 
vote for an unequal society they do not seek personal profit to increase 
total societal wealth, and they consistently contribute high amounts to 
the public good to increase the total societal wealth irrespective of their 
individual outcomes. 
However, we find no evidence suggesting that cooperative individu-
als show general preferences for equal income distributions, as those 
participants who initially voted for an equal society did not exhibit more  
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Table 10: OLS regression models for the influence of attitudinal 
similarity and class affiliation on public good game contributions 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 b (SD) b (SD) b (SD) 
Constant 1.47 (.14)*** 1.56 (.17)*** 1.63 (.24)*** 
Attitudinal similarity  .31 (.16) .33 (.17)* .24 (.28) 
Middle Class  -.22 (.18) -.01 (.37) 
Lower Class  -.08 (.18) -.36 (.33) 
Attitudinal similarity x  
middle class   -.25 (.42) 
Attitudinal similarity x  
lower class   .41 (.39) 
R² .01 .02 .03 
Δ R² .01 .01 .01 
Notes: Attitudinal similarity, middle class and lower class are dummy variables coded 
in a way that 1 represents the respective feature. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. 
cooperative behavior than their counterparts. Consequently, our results 
contradict the assumption that a mechanism based on self-selection 
underlies the association between inequality and cooperation. 
The second mechanism that we suggested was based on similarity 
considerations and argued that inequality does not necessarily hamper 
cooperation; instead, dissimilar attitudes towards the desirable degree 
of inequality cause decreases in cooperation. However, we find no evi-
dence to support the notion that such a mechanism based on similarity 
considerations underlies the association between inequality and coop-
eration. Model 4 in Table 10 shows that attitudinal similarity, measured 
by the conformity of the participants’ votes and the implemented degree 
of inequality in their society6 did not affect the participants’ behaviors in 
the public good game. Hence, dissimilar attitudes towards the desirable 
degree of inequality did not harm cooperation in our experiment.  
This finding remains robust when we control for the influence of 
class affiliation (model 5)7 and the interactions between class affiliation 
                                                 
6 Similar results were obtained by analyzing a trichotomous variable with -1 indicating 
that the other group members voted for the opposite alternative, 0 indicating that one 
group members voted for the same alternative and the other one for the opposite al-
ternative, and 1 indicating that the other group members voted for the same alterna-
tive as the participant. 
7
 The model remains insignificant (F [3, 268] = 1.74, p =.16) indicating that the seem-
ingly significant effect of attitudinal similarity should not be interpreted as such. 
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and attitudinal similarity (model 6). Therefore, we find no evidence sup-
porting the assumption that attitudinal similarity alters cooperative be-
havior which clearly contradicts the predictions of a mechanism based 
on similarity consideration. Therefore, our findings thus far indicate 
that the mechanism underlying the negative effect of inequality on co-
operation is based neither on similarity considerations nor on self-
selection. 
To determine whether one of the remaining mechanisms accounts 
for the presented findings, we investigate how class affiliation and ine-
quality interacted with regard to cooperation. Table 11 presents the re-
sults of our OLS regression models 7-9. While model 7 replicates the 
previously stated main finding that high inequality reduced cooperation, 
model 8 indicates that this finding does not change when we control for 
class affiliation. In model 9, we investigate whether the effect of inequal-
ity on cooperation depends on class affiliation which provides us with 
additional insights into the basic mechanism behind the inequality-
cooperation relationship. 
The third mechanism that we suggested was based on risk consid-
erations and argued that the democratic implementation of inequality 
hampers cooperation because it increases the perceived risk of exploita-
tion. The mechanism predicted that, due to these enhanced risk percep-
tions, all members of a society reduce cooperation. However, the report-
ed results in model 9 do not support this prediction. First, within the 
equal societies, cooperation was stable between classes, as indicated by 
the coefficients for the middle class and the lower class being insignifi-
cant. Second, the significant effect of being affiliated with the unequal 
society reported in models 7 and 8 vanishes, which indicates that con-
tributions to the public good did not differ between upper-class partici-
pants affiliated with the equal society and the unequal society. There-
fore, inequality did not reduce cooperation among all members of an 
unequal society, which contradicts the assumptions made regarding a 
mechanism based on risk considerations. 
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Table 11: OLS regression models for the influence of society and 
class affiliation on public good game contributions 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 b (SD) b (SD) b (SD) 
Constant 1.89 (.09)*** 1.99 (.14)*** 1.79 (.16)*** 
Unequal Society -.50 (.15)** -.50 (.15)** .04 (.25) 
Middle Class  -.19 (.18) .14 (.22) 
Lower Class  -.12 (.18) .16 (.22) 
Unequal society x  
middle class   -.86 (.36)* 
Unequal society x  
lower class   -.77 (.36)* 
R² .04*** .05** .07** 
Δ R² .04*** .004 .03* 
Notes: Unequal society, middle class and lower class are dummy variables coded in a  
way that 1 represents the respective feature. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. 
The fourth mechanism that we suggested was based on inequality 
aversion and argued that reduced cooperation under conditions of high 
inequality is a byproduct of attempting to install a more equal distribu-
tion of wealth. For this experiment, the mechanism predicted that ine-
quality reduces cooperation only among lower-class participants. Yet, 
this prediction is not supported by model 9. It shows that the initially 
detected lower levels of cooperation in unequal societies seem to be 
driven by low levels of cooperation among their middle- and lower-class 
participants. Middle-class participants in the unequal society contribut-
ed €0.86 less and lower-class participants in the unequal society con-
tributed €0.77 less than our reference group of upper class participants 
in the equal society. Hence, contradicting a mechanism based on ine-
quality aversion we find that inequality decreased cooperation not only 
for lower-class participants, but also for middle-class participants. 
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Figure 10: Public good game contributions separated by society and 
class affiliation 
 
Finally, the fifth mechanism that we suggested was based on moti-
vated reasoning and assumed that inequality harms cooperation be-
cause it delivers people the justification for self-serving behavior. The 
mechanism assumed that inequality would cause low levels of coopera-
tion among middle- and lower-class participants but that cooperation 
would not be affected in the upper class. These predictions are affirmed 
by the presented results of our experiment. To illustrate this finding, 
Figure 10 compares the average public good game contributions of up-
per-, middle- and lower-class participants in societies with high and low 
inequality. As already noted, upper-class participants’ contributions did 
not significantly differ in these two societies, which indicates similar 
levels of cooperation. However, middle- and lower-class participants of 
the unequal society cooperated less than their respective counterparts 
in the equal society. Middle-class participants in the equal society con-
tributed more money to the public good than their counterparts in the 
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Mann-Whitney U test). Hence, differences in contributions between the 
equal and unequal society seem to be caused by contribution differ-
ences between the middle- and lower-class participants of both socie-
ties, as predicted by a basic mechanism based on motivated reasoning.  
In summary, the presented findings thus contradict basic mecha-
nisms based on self-selection, similarity considerations, risk considera-
tions, and inequality aversion, while they support the notion that a 
mechanism based on motivated reasoning causes inequality to harm 
cooperation.8 
4.6 Conclusion 
Previous research has found that the origin of economic inequality 
plays a critical role in its eventual effect on cooperative behavior and 
economic growth. In this context, recent studies report that especially 
endogenously induced inequality harms cooperation. Nevertheless, eco-
nomic inequality that results endogenously from a democratic process 
has thus far been neglected in experimental research. With a novel ex-
perimental design this paper investigates for the first time the effect of 
economic inequality on cooperative behavior when inequality is the re-
sult of a democratic decision within fictive societies. This design enables 
us to transfer the principle of the democratic welfare state to the labora-
tory and allows us to derive valuable insights into the relationship be-
tween inequality and cooperation.  
Regarding the democratic determination of the degree of inequality 
in a society, we find further evidence indicating a human aversion to 
inequality (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000) and repli-
cate the findings of a former experiment by Lotz and Fetchenhauer 
(2012). Most of our participants opt for a low degree of inequality. Par-
ticularly lower-class participants vote almost exclusively for a society 
with low inequality, but we also find that notable proportions of upper- 
                                                 
8 An OLS regression model integrating the presented OLS regression models 3, 6, and 
9 reveals consistent results indicating the presented findings to be robust. 
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and middle-class participants opt for low inequality, although this deci-
sion is not in their financial self-interest. 
Furthermore, consistent with our main assumption, our results 
suggest that inequality resulting from these democratic decisions re-
duces contributions in the public good game and hence cooperation. 
Interestingly, previous research argues that economic inequality pri-
marily affects people if it results from an unfair procedure (Bolton, 
Brandts, & Ockenfels, 2005; Haile et al., 2008). At least at first glance, 
the implementation of a policy that is supported by the majority and is 
determined democratically seems to be an example for a fair procedure, 
yet our results indicate that inequality still harms the level of societal 
cooperation. Hence, future research should investigate the perceived 
fairness of democratic processes in the regarded context. Furthermore, 
conditions should be determined under which inequality harms cooper-
ation, even if it results from a seemingly fair procedure.  
With regard to the basic mechanism underlying the association be-
tween inequality and cooperation, we find that individuals who initially 
preferred a distribution based on the standards of an equal society do 
not show more cooperative behavior than those who voted for an une-
qual society. Consequently, the result of the vote rather than the vote 
itself seems to ultimately determine the cooperation levels among our 
participants. Hence, a mechanism based on the self-selection of more 
cooperative individuals into a society with a higher degree of inequality 
did not to cause the negative relationship between inequality and coop-
eration. Furthermore, the conformity of the participants’ votes and the 
implemented degree of inequality in their society, and thus a similarity 
in attitudes, did not alter cooperative behavior. Therefore, we also can-
not find that a mechanism based on similarity considerations affects 
the level of cooperation.  
Thus, so far, our results correspond with findings that indicate that 
people use levels of endogenously evoked inequality to determine the 
risk of cooperation, with higher inequality signaling previously selfish 
and thus uncooperative behavior (Greiner et al., 2012). However, if we 
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consider our results on the interaction between inequality and the stud-
ied fictive societal classes a risk-based explanation is not supported ei-
ther. Because of the equally distributed information within our experi-
ment, a risk-based mechanism predicts a cooperation-reducing effect of 
inequality with regard to all the observed societal classes. Instead, our 
results clearly contradict this assumption by showing that inequality 
decreases cooperation only among middle- and lower-class participants.  
In line with the latter part of the previously mentioned finding, a 
mechanism based on inequality aversion correctly predicts that a high 
degree of inequality decreases cooperation among lower class partici-
pants, yet the result that inequality also decreases cooperation among 
middle-class participants does not support the mechanisms predictions. 
Therefore, we can also rule out that inequality aversion underlies the 
damaging effect of inequality on cooperation. 
From the potential mechanisms depicted in Chapter 4.3, our re-
sults promote a basic mechanism based on motivated reasoning. Based 
on this mechanism, we correctly predicted that inequality negatively 
affects cooperation in general because it causes less cooperation among 
middle- and lower-class participants. Hence, it seems as if inequality 
harms cooperation in democratic systems because it delivers middle 
and lower class participants a sufficiently plausible justification for self-
serving, uncooperative behavior. 
Future research might investigate whether the depicted lines of 
thought (see Chapter 4.3) underlying the eventual decisions of upper-, 
middle-, and lower-class participants resemble reality. Furthermore, it 
would be interesting to explore the impact of democratically determined 
inequality on cooperative behavior if participants repeatedly interact 
with one another. If our assumptions about the reasoning underlying 
the observed behavioral pattern were correct, upper-class participants, 
for example, would be expected to adjust their behavior in future inter-
actions. As outlined above, upper-class participants might initially be 
motivated to believe that the implementation of inequality and contribu-
tions to the public good operate independently. However, they may 
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abandon this belief once they realize that the two situations are not 
perceived to be independent by their group members. Consequently, 
they might be motivated to reason in favor of not cooperating them-
selves. In a new line of thought, upper-class participants might perceive 
themselves to fall prey to unjustified exploitation by middle- and lower-
class participants and ultimately reduce their level of cooperation, too. 
This new line of thought might even motivate upper-class participants 
to punish the other group members not cooperating and to promote the 
further rise of inequality if they have the chance to do so. Hence, future 
research should explore the role of motivated reasoning in the context of 
inequality in general and with regard to the association between ine-
quality and cooperation in particular.  
In summary, our results indicate that economic inequality result-
ing from a democratic process harms cooperative behavior in societies 
by particularly affecting the cooperativeness of middle- and lower-class 
members. The basic mechanism behind this association is based nei-
ther on self-selection, similarity considerations, risk considerations, nor 
inequality aversion; instead, it is based on motivated reasoning. Thus, 
the decreasing effect of inequality on cooperation goes beyond what 
might be explained by an already existing predisposition to cooperate, 
which implies that reducing economic inequality in a society causally 
influences and elevates the level of societal cooperation, thereby 
strengthening societal prosperity. 
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5 General discussion 
5.1 Key findings and overall implications 
In three studies, we investigated various facets of wealth and in-
come inequality in experimental settings. Overall, the presented results 
provide further evidence for the notion that inequality is generally per-
ceived to be unjust and substantiate the idea that wealth and income 
disparities elicit various undesirable consequences, particularly at a 
group level (e.g., within societies). In the following section, I will sum-
marize the main findings and discuss further implications of the ob-
served patterns. 
5.1.1 Inequality and justice 
With regard to justice perceptions the presented findings in Chap-
ter 2 underline previous theoretical and empirical research indicating 
that high inequality is associated with perceived injustice (e.g. Deutsch, 
1975; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Lotz & 
Fetchenhauer, 2012). The participants who benefited from inequality 
and the participants who suffered because of inequality considered ex-
treme income disparities unjust. In retrospect, this finding is particular-
ly noteworthy because it applies to both the beneficiaries of inequality 
and the ones who suffer because of inequality. Hence, the perception of 
inequality as unjust seems to be common. Yet, our results show that 
the importance attributed to these justice concerns and thus their im-
plications arguably differ among persons. 
As revealed in Chapter 3, the degree to which persons are con-
cerned about justice (i.e., their degree of JS) partly explains individual 
differences in equality preferences. In a democratic vote on the distribu-
tion of societal wealth, persons with genuinely strong justice concerns 
(i.e., those who had high JSothers scores) were found to favor low degrees 
of inequality, irrespective of whether this choice was in their financial 
self-interest. By contrast, persons who were predominantly concerned 
about not being the victim of injustice themselves (i.e., those who had 
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high JSvictim scores) did not show any specific preferences with regard to 
economic disparities; instead, they voted to implement the degree of in-
equality that agreed with their financial self-interest. If high inequality 
was connected to financial gains for them, they wanted societal wealth 
to be distributed unequally, and if low inequality was connected to fi-
nancial gains, they wanted societal wealth to be distributed equally. 
Taken together, our results strongly suggest an important role of 
justice concerns with regard to economic inequality. Particularly if ine-
quality is determined democratically, its perception as unjust is of high 
importance, as this perception influences people’s preferences for the 
level of inequality within a democratic system. However, the close asso-
ciation between inequality and injustice does not necessarily result in 
people refraining from inequality in democratic systems. It rather leads 
to genuine egalitarian preferences only among those who are highly 
sensitive to justice violations that affect other people. 
5.1.2 Inequality and its affective, emotional, and cooperative con-
sequences 
With regard to the consequences of inequality the presented find-
ings in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 support prior research (e.g., Wilkinson 
& Pickett, 2009a) indicating that inequality predominantly causes con-
sequences that are commonly perceived as undesirable. Chapter 2 re-
ported that severe income inequality elicits negative affect, anger, and 
guilt among most of the persons concerned. In addition, Chapter 4 re-
vealed that wealth inequality implemented through a democratic proce-
dure harms the level of cooperation in groups (e.g., societies).  
However, it has to be emphasized that the results in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 4 strongly suggest that the observed effects of wealth and 
income disparities depend on a person’s position within their respective 
distributional system. The aforementioned negative consequences can 
mostly be attributed to those who suffer because of inequality. These 
persons experience strong negative affect, anger, and even guilt (Chap-
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ter 2), and are less willing to cooperate because of inequality (Chapter 
4). 
By contrast, the beneficiaries seem to experience inequality quite 
differently. In Chapter 2, we found them to display predominantly posi-
tive affect without exhibiting significantly elevated levels of guilt. In 
Chapter 4, we found that inequality did not impair the willingness to 
cooperate among its greatest beneficiaries (i.e., upper-class partici-
pants). Taken together, these results might be interpreted to reflect a 
certain mindlessness of inequality beneficiaries. They enjoy the privileg-
es of what they regard as unjust income disparities without guilt and 
seem to be at least partly ignorant regarding the effects that inequality 
has on societal cooperation and others’ emotional and affective experi-
ences. 
5.1.3 Overall implications 
The presented empirical findings have made it unmistakably clear 
that economic inequality cannot be understood without recognizing the 
foundation it is build upon and accounting for the different perspectives 
associated to it. All reported studies imply, that with regard to inequali-
ty, it is crucial to consider whether inequality is advantageous or disad-
vantageous to a given individual. Inequality particularly elicits undesir-
able consequences among the disadvantaged, whereas its experience 
significantly differs for the greatest beneficiaries in whom it might even 
elicit rewarding feelings (i.e., positive affect). 
In Chapter 1.2, I pointed out the contradiction between the obser-
vation of rising inequality in democratic societies and research findings 
indicating a large consensus among people in perceiving high inequality 
to be unjust. The reported findings might add to an explanation of this 
observation. Recent research in political science suggested that even in 
democratic societies the wealthy exert more influence on policy-making 
and particularly on economic policies than the poor (Winter & Page, 
2009). Hence, it might be presumed that the way inequality is perceived 
and evaluated by its beneficiaries is more important for the development 
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and persistence of societal inequality than its perception and evaluation 
by its victims. Although inequality might be commonly considered un-
just irrespective of one’s social position, we found that among the bene-
ficiaries of inequality only those who hold genuine justice concerns for 
others show real preferences for a low degree of economic inequality 
(Chapter 3). Thus, our finding that the translation of justice perceptions 
to equality preferences depends on justice sensitivity, might partially 
explain the contradiction between rising inequality and perceptions of 
injustice in democratic societies. 
Additionally, the empirical results revealed that beneficiaries ex-
perience inequality to be emotionally rewarding if they do not feel ac-
countable for it (Chapter 2). Hence, inequality may also elicit positive 
affect and emotions among its beneficiaries in democratic systems. 
However, to allow for these feelings to arise it might be sufficient if 
beneficiaries are not aware of their accountability or convince them-
selves by motivated reasoning of not being accountable (Kunda, 1990). 
For instance, in Chapter 4 we have seen that motivated reasoning may 
let the greatest beneficiaries of inequality (i.e., upper-class participants) 
conclude that their previous behavior is not important for future inter-
actions with the same individuals. In a similar way inequality might 
cause rewarding emotions among beneficiaries in democratic systems 
that are objectively accountable for inequality. These rewarding, positive 
feelings might influence people’s behavior and guide them to make more 
selfish decisions (e.g., Forgas & Tan, 2013) which further promote in-
creasing inequality. Hence, our results suggest that the positive impli-
cations inequality has for its beneficiaries may partly account for its re-
cent development and persistence in democratic societies. 
However, if we realistically assume the beneficiaries of inequality 
to be a comparatively smaller group within a society, it is important to 
stress that our findings imply severe negative consequences caused by 
inequality for a majority of people and the society as a whole. For in-
stance, the negative affect and emotions inequality evokes among those 
who are disadvantaged may translate into undesirable behavioral pat-
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terns (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Lee & Allen, 2002) or lead to 
resignation accompanied by physical and mental health issues among 
the concerned people (Layte, 2012; Weiner, 2014; Wilkinson & Pickett, 
2009a).  
Furthermore, our results revealed a reduced willingness to coop-
erate not only among those who objectively suffer from inequality, but 
also among people who just do not benefit as much from it as others. 
These findings indicate that inequality divides a society which is likely 
to have severe consequences for its future economic and social prosperi-
ty (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001).  
Thus, in summary the presented empirical research suggests that 
on an individual level the affective, emotional, and behavioral conse-
quences of inequality depend on whether inequality is advantageous or 
disadvantageous for an individual. However, on the group-level our 
findings strongly suggest that inequality evokes severe undesirable con-
sequences, which is why the wide attention the topic has received in 
recent years seems to be justified. Hence, there can be no doubt that 
future political, scientific, and economical effort needs to be made to 
understand and hopefully solve the problems connected to economic 
inequality. 
5.2 Critical appraisal  
5.2.1 Inequality in democratic systems 
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, my co-authors and I aimed to inves-
tigate inequality in democratic systems by refraining from commonly 
used randomized or merit-based methods for implementing inequality 
in experiments and by applying the welfare state game (Biniossek & 
Fetchenhauer, 2007; Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012)—a paradigm that cre-
ates inequality based on majority choice. As reviewed in Chapter 4, pre-
vious experimental research has indicated that the origin of inequality 
is a crucial determinant of its eventual effects (e.g.; Greiner et al., 
2012). Thus, we believe that the method applied in Chapters 3 and 4 
increases the external validity of the presented results, and future re-
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search in the area of inequality in democratic systems may benefit from 
the application of the welfare state game or similar paradigms to induce 
inequality. 
However, the applied designs might have certain limitations. For 
instance, when we focused on the association of democratically induced 
inequality and cooperation in Chapter 4, cooperation was measured 
immediately after the democratic procedure that determined inequality. 
Therefore, our participants were presumably highly aware of the con-
nection between their vote and the implemented degree of inequality. In 
reality, however, a person’s awareness of his or her influence on the pol-
icies that determine societal inequality might be low. Elections usually 
take place once every few years, which might decrease the individuals’ 
awareness of the connection between voting and the current level of in-
equality. Furthermore, the great number of people in real democratic 
nations might facilitate a certain diffusion of responsibility (Darley & 
Latané, 1968) among their citizens and promote a feeling of low self-
efficacy (Bandura, 1977). People might probably think that their votes 
do not influence anything. Thus, in reality, people, although part of a 
democratic system, might have little awareness of their personal influ-
ence on and responsibility for societal inequality.  
If so, the real effect of inequality on cooperation in democratic 
systems might substantially differ from what was observed in Chapter 
4. Hence, future research should investigate whether people’s aware-
ness of their influence on inequality in democratic systems moderates 
the effects of inequality on cooperation and other potentially related 
constructs. 
5.2.2 Wealth/income differences versus status differentials 
As aforementioned, the presented findings emphasize that differ-
ent positions within an unequal distribution crucially determine the in-
dividuals’ equality preferences and the effects of inequality. Therefore, 
the consideration of these positions and different perspectives on ine-
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quality seems critical when gathering further insights into the develop-
ment, persistence, and impact of inequality.  
In this context, we probably did not sufficiently differentiate be-
tween what might be called the social component of inequality (i.e., sta-
tus differences) and the economic component of inequality (i.e., income, 
respectively wealth differences), which might qualify as a limitation of 
the present research (see, for example Goldthorpe, 2010). For instance, 
in Chapter 2 we suggested that the major dissimilarities in the affect 
and emotions experiences by the advantaged and disadvantaged of ine-
quality might result from disparities in payment and/or status (i.e., a 
person’s relative rank in the social hierarchy of a group). However, due 
to the study’s design, we were not able to determine whether the one or 
the other was crucial.  
To explore the determinants of affective experiences in compensa-
tion systems more closely, Steiniger, Schlösser, and Fetchenhauer 
(2015b) created an experiment based on the design applied in Chapter 
2. Similar to the presented experiment, the participants had to solve 
real effort tasks after being assigned to either the equality system or the 
tournament system and reported their affective states after they were 
informed about their payoffs. However, in contrast to the reported ex-
periment in Chapter 2, both systems provided participants with relative 
performance feedback (i.e., participants were informed if they performed 
best, second best, and so on). Previous research has found that deliver-
ing such performance feedback is sufficient to create status differences 
among co-workers (Charness, Masclet, & Villeval, 2014). Payments in 
the equality system did not depend on the participants’ relative perfor-
mance, whereas payments in the tournament system did. Therefore, 
status differences and income differences were implemented inde-
pendently. 
The results supported the notion that affective experiences were 
mainly caused by status disparities, as indicated by the relative perfor-
mance feedback’s positive association with positive affect and negative 
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association with negative affect. By contrast, actual income was a minor 
factor for affective experiences (Steiniger et al., 2015b). 
Hence, these results suggest that the social component (i.e., sta-
tus) of inequality might have an independent, probably even more im-
portant, influence on affective experiences than the economic compo-
nent (i.e., income) (see also Easterlin, 1973). Because of the crucial role 
that a person’s position within an unequal distribution played in the 
previously reported findings, it seems an interesting and important task 
for future research to further disentangle these social and economic 
components within inequality.  
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6 Future research 
In what follows, I will outline selected ideas for future research 
based on the empirical results and underlying theory in Chapters 2–4. 
In particular, the presented research ideas aim to account for some of 
the previously discussed limitations and attempt to expand the scope of 
the presented findings. 
6.1 Inequality in democratic systems 
6.1.1 Inequality and affect in democratic systems 
In Chapter 2, I pointed out that exogenously implemented high 
inequality, once present, elicits fundamentally different affective states 
and emotions among its beneficiaries and among those who suffer be-
cause of it. However, based on the same theoretical background, this 
result would be expected to change once the degree of inequality is en-
dogenously, not exogenously, implemented. Hence, high inequality re-
sulting from a democratic process (i.e., endogenously implemented ine-
quality) should elicit affective states and emotions that are more closely 
related to justice perceptions. Justice has been argued to elicit positive 
affect and emotions and injustice has been argued to elicit negative af-
fect and emotions (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2013). As a consequence, people 
should predominantly experience positive affect if a democratic decision 
results in low inequality and negative affect if a democratic decision re-
sults in high inequality (see Chapter 2.1.4 and Chapter 2.1.5 for more 
detail).  
These affective differences resulting from the democratic imple-
mentation of either high or low inequality may influence future distribu-
tional decisions. Generally, affect and emotions have been found to im-
pact behavior and decision making in various ways (e.g., see Colquitt et 
al., 2013; Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2014). Positive affect, for in-
stance, promotes internally focused information processing (Bless & 
Fiedler, 2006; Clore & Storbeck, 2006). Therefore, Forgas and Tan 
(2013) argued that positive affect should lead to more self-serving deci-
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sions, because people are focused on their internal needs. The authors 
experimentally investigated this assumption providing evidence in its 
support. Consequently, people who experience high levels of positive 
affect can be expected to make particularly selfish decisions.  
In contrast to positive affect, negative affect should promote ex-
ternally focused information processing (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Clore & 
Storbeck, 2006) and thus enhance the focus on external demands and 
facilitate compliance with social norms (Forgas & Tan, 2013). This as-
sumption is supported by experimental results indicating that negative 
affect promotes prosocial decisions (Forgas & Tan, 2013) and is associ-
ated with the rejection of unequal offers in behavioral paradigms 
(Sanfey, Rilling, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & 
Aleman, 2006). Hence, people who experience high levels of negative 
affect can be expected to make decisions in favor of more equal income 
distributions. 
To test these predictions and to learn about the development of 
societal inequality in democratic systems, it might be helpful to conduct 
an experiment in which participants repeatedly interact with each other 
and determine their society’s level of inequality over multiple periods. 
Such multi-period designs are commonly used in experimental research 
on topics such as economic growth (e.g., Greiner et al., 2012), and they 
may also prove valuable with regard to inequality. 
In the first period of such an experiment, the welfare state game 
may be used as presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The participants 
should be assigned to fictive societal classes and democratically deter-
mine the initial degree of inequality in their fictive society. After the re-
sult of the democratic vote is revealed to the participants, their justice 
perceptions should be surveyed and their affective states should be 
measured. Because it is likely to reveal the most realistic picture of 
people’s final justice perceptions, overall justice should be evaluated 
(Ambrose & Schminke, 2009; Barclay & Kiefer, 2014; see also Chapter 
2.1.2), while affect might be assessed with the PANAS-X scales (Watson 
& Clark, 1999). In a subsequent second round of the welfare state 
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game, the participants might again decide whether to implement low or 
high inequality. 
This experimental design would reveal several new insights into 
the association between affect and inequality in democratic systems. 
First, it would be possible to investigate whether the detected affect is 
significantly related to people’s justice perceptions. Second, insights in-
to the stability of distributional preferences in democratic systems 
would be revealed. Third, it would be possible to test the hypothesis 
that positive and negative affect mediate distributional decisions in 
Round 2. 
If the results of the described experiment were to reveal a close 
association between justice perceptions and affect in a situation in 
which inequality was implemented democratically, this would provide 
further support for the crucial role of accountability in the regarded re-
lationship (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, finding affective states to mod-
erate distributional preferences in Round 2 might extend the literature 
claiming that inequality-averse behavior is motivated by feelings (e.g., 
Dawes et al., 2007). 
6.1.2 Inequality and emotions in democratic systems 
Modifications in the previously presented experimental design 
may reveal further insights into the area of inequality in democratic sys-
tems. For instance, instead of focusing on affective states, the previous 
experiment could also be conducted with a focus on emotions. In recent 
years, scholars have argued that specific emotions rather than general 
affective states cause behaviors and decisions (for a recent review, see 
Lerner et al., 2014).  
In the context of the aforementioned experiment, it would be par-
ticularly interesting to investigate the association between distributional 
decisions in the second round and the emotions regarded in Chapter 
2—i.e., guilt and anger. As previously argued, in the context of demo-
cratic decision-making, justice perceptions can be expected to affect 
emotions (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 6.1.1). Hence, if a high degree of 
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inequality is implemented, upper- and middle-class participants who 
voted in its favor can be expected to feel guilty, whereas lower-class par-
ticipants, who most likely voted against its implementation (see, for ex-
ample Lotz & Fetchenhauer, 2012; and voting results in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4), can be expected to feel angry (Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000; 
Weiss et al., 1999). Both of these emotions may foster the desire to at-
tain a lower degree of inequality. Guilt may motivate upper- and middle-
class participants to ensure that, in future interactions, lower-class par-
ticipants will be treated more fairly and will be more likely to receive 
better outcomes (Cryder, Springer, & Morewedge, 2012; Cunningham, 
Steinberg, & Grev, 1980). Anger may motivate lower-class participants 
to make decisions that reduce the outcomes of upper- and middle-class 
participants in future interactions (Dawes et al., 2007). 
Envy is another emotion that would be interesting to investigate 
in this context, as “envy occurs when a person lacks another’s superior 
quality, achievement, or possession and either desires it or wishes that 
the other lacked it” (Parrott & Smith, 1993, p. 906). In the presented 
experiment, lower-class participants might be assumed to envy middle- 
and upper-class participants once high inequality is implemented; more 
interestingly, middle-class participants might also envy upper-class 
participants because the latter benefit even more from high inequality 
than the former do. Surprisingly little research examines the behavioral 
consequences of envy, yet prior research has associated envy with ra-
ther antisocial behavior, such as reduced cooperation and deception 
directed towards the envied person (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008; Smith & 
Kim, 2007). 
Therefore, a study focusing on specific emotions may be particu-
larly helpful in determining the motivation underlying inequality-averse 
behavior and will likely reveal a complex interplay of various emotions 
that cause this behavioral phenomenon. 
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6.1.3 Inequality, affect, and/or emotions in democratic systems in 
the long(er) run 
A more sophisticated design than that of the previously presented 
experiments could aim to account for some of the previously mentioned 
limitations, for example, by manipulating awareness and perceived ac-
countability. As discussed in Chapter 5.2.1, in democratic systems, the 
elections determining a society’s level of inequality are likely be tempo-
rarily distinct from the occasions in which people encounter inequality, 
which might reduce people’s awareness of the links between the two. 
However, the perceived connectedness between an individual’s vote and 
societal inequality presumably determines his or her perceived account-
ability for inequality, which, in turn, is likely to influence affect and 
emotions and ultimately their consequences.  
For instance, we previously assumed that, in democratic systems, 
upper-class participants who voted in favor of high inequality might feel 
guilty once inequality is actually implemented (Chapter 6.1.2) and thus 
treat in particular lower-class participants more fairly in future interac-
tions (Cryder et al., 2012). However, this behavior will only occur if up-
per-class participants consider themselves accountable for the conse-
quences that lower-class participants have to suffer. If upper-class par-
ticipants do not sense or acknowledge the link between inequality and 
their vote, they presumably experience the positive affect and emotions 
observed in Chapter 2. Eventually, these emotional differences might 
even cause inequality-promoting behavior rather than inequality-
reducing behavior (Forgas & Tan, 2013). 
To test these hypotheses and investigate the influence of temporal 
distinctions on affective and emotional reactions to democratically in-
duced inequality, a further condition could be added to the previously 
described experiment. In addition to measuring justice perceptions, af-
fect, emotions, and their consequences immediately after the democrat-
ic determination of inequality, the initial decision in the welfare state 
game could be temporally separated from the assessment of the afore-
mentioned constructs. For example, in the first phase, participants 
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could be invited to the laboratory to determine societal inequality in the 
welfare state game, as in the experiments described in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4. Afterwards, they would be told the election result of their 
group and asked to make an appointment for a second phase one or 
two weeks later. At the beginning of Phase 2, the participants would 
then receive their outcomes from the first welfare state game, prior to 
stating their justice perceptions, affect, emotions and making their deci-
sions in a second welfare state game. 
In the analysis, the surveyed affect and emotions from this condi-
tion could be compared to the affect and emotions surveyed in a condi-
tion similar to those in the experimental designs depicted in Chapter 
6.1.1 or Chapter 6.1.2. The results would provide further information 
about the role of perceived accountability with regard to affective and 
emotional experiences resulting from inequality. Furthermore, they 
might add to the understanding of the development and persistence of 
inequality in democratic systems. The finding that low awareness pro-
motes positive emotions which cause inequality promoting-behavior 
among the beneficiaries of inequality, might partly explain why inequali-
ty in democratic systems increases even though it is commonly consid-
ered unjust. 
Alternative approaches to investigate similar research questions 
might increase the number of participants in the welfare state game to 
reduce perceived accountability or increase perceived accountability for 
some participant by selecting dictators who determine inequality in the 
welfare state game on their own. 
6.2 Inequality and trust 
As presented in Chapter 1.3, prior research suggests that the 
consequences of inequality are not limited to affect, emotions, and co-
operation. Another concept which is often assigned a crucial role in ine-
quality research is trust (Layte, 2012; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009a; Zak 
& Knack, 2001). Trust is closely connected to cooperation (Chapter 4) 
and was argued to be of high importance for economic, political, and 
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social behavior (Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010; Hardin, 2002). Therefore, 
I propose to extend the presented findings by investigating the associa-
tion between inequality and trust in depth. 
6.2.1 The causal direction 
Although the relationship between inequality and trust on a soci-
etal level is generally well-documented (Bjørnskov, 2007; Knack & 
Keefer, 1997; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Uslaner, 2002; Zak & Knack, 
2001), the causal direction of this relationship and its underlying 
mechanisms remain unclear. Several competing mechanisms have been 
brought forward to explain the relationship between trust and inequali-
ty (Jordahl, 2009). The most popular causal assumption for the trust-
inequality relationship states that higher levels of inequality lead to low-
er levels of trust (e.g., Dehley & Newton, 2005; Uslaner, 2002). However, 
other scholars argued that higher levels of trust among people result in 
more equal societies (Bergh & Bjørnskov, 2014). Hence, in a first study, 
the causal relationship between inequality and trust should be deter-
mined.  
Causality in the inequality-trust relationship might be investigat-
ed in a design based on the welfare state game in Chapter 3 and Chap-
ter 4. The topic would require for a two-phase study. In the first phase, 
the baseline trust level of all the participants would have to be sur-
veyed. A so-called trust game could potentially be used for this purpose 
(Berg et al., 1995).  
The standard trust game comprises two anonymous subjects—
trustor and trustee—who both receive equally large initial endowments 
of money. In the first step, the trustor has the opportunity to send any 
amount of his or her endowment to the trustee. The money sent is mul-
tiplied by a fixed factor larger than 1 (to assure social efficiency) and is 
given to the trustee, who then decides how much he or she wants to 
send back to the trustor. Because a rational trustor would deduce that 
the trustee has no incentive to send money back, the predicted behavior 
for the trustor is to keep the entire initial endowment (Berg et al., 1995). 
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However, numerous studies have shown that actual behavior dif-
fers from this prediction and that trustors send, on average, approxi-
mately 50% of their initial endowment to the trustees (Camerer, 2003). 
Therefore, the amount sent by the trustor is usually interpreted as 
trust, whereas the amount returned by the trustee is interpreted as 
trustworthiness.  
To gather data on the trust levels of all the participants, they need 
to make a decision in the trustor role. This goal can be achieved effi-
ciently with a small manipulation of the original design, which has al-
ready been applied in prior research (e.g., Dunning, Anderson, 
Schlösser, Ehlebracht, & Fetchenhauer, 2014). The participants in the 
trust game are asked to make their decisions in the trustor role and in 
the trustee role. In this version of the trust game, the role that eventual-
ly determines the participants’ outcomes is only subsequently assigned 
to them at random.  
The second phase of the experiment should take place about one 
or two weeks after the first phase and should comprise a welfare state 
game and a second trust game. The welfare state game could be de-
signed exactly like those employed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The 
trust game could be similar to the one previously described, except that 
participants should be informed that their counterpart in the trust 
game will be a participant with whom they have already interacted in 
the welfare state game. Please note that the result of the first trust game 
should not be revealed to the participants before the end of the entire 
study to avoid possible confounding effects. 
If the assumption that trust causally effects inequality were accu-
rate, the results of the described experiment would show that exhibiting 
more trust in Phase 1 increases the likelihood of voting for the low-
inequality alternative in the welfare state game. However, the degree of 
inequality resulting from the welfare state game would not impact the 
level of trust in the second trust game.  
If, however, the assumption that inequality causally effects trust 
were accurate, the results should show that trust levels exhibited in 
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Phase 1 are unrelated to the participants’ votes in the welfare state 
game. Instead, the degree of inequality resulting from the welfare state 
game would influence the level of trust in the second trust game. The 
participants in the fictive societies that ultimately implemented the low-
inequality alternative would exhibit consistent or higher trust levels 
compared to those in the first trust game. By contrast, the participants 
in fictive societies that ultimately implemented the high-inequality al-
ternative would exhibit lower levels of trust in the second trust game. 
Solving the causality issue in the trust-inequality relationship 
would yield important implications for policy-making. The finding that 
inequality is the causal prior would imply, for instance, that trust could 
be fostered by reducing economic inequality with all the associated so-
cietal advantages an increase in trust entails. 
6.2.2 The underlying mechanisms 
If we assume that inequality would causally influence trust, an 
interesting follow-up study might investigate the underlying mecha-
nisms of this relationship. The possible mechanisms behind this effect 
may be driven, for example, by the informational value of a society’s de-
gree of inequality or, referring to Chapter 2, by the emotional conse-
quences of inequality. 
A mechanism based on the informational value of inequality as-
sumes that the degree of inequality in a society informs people about 
the values of others (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005) and delivers infor-
mation about previous behaviors (Greiner et al., 2012). Transferred to 
the framework of democratic systems, this assumption implies that the 
democratic implementation of a system that fosters equality may signal 
a general willingness to cooperate and share possible winnings, thereby 
reducing perceived risk and enhancing trust. Instead, the democratic 
implementation of a political system that fosters inequality may signal 
previous and potentially future selfish behaviors and thereby increase 
the perceived risk of being exploited and erode trust. The mechanism 
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thus predicts a decrease in trust among all members of a society, as a 
majority of selfish individuals increases the general risk of trust. 
A mechanism based on the emotional consequences of inequality 
assumes that trust decreases in unequal societies because people be-
come frustrated about their place in the social hierarchy. Unequally dis-
tributed wealth or income might lead to anger among the disadvantaged 
persons, as shown in Chapter 2; anger, in turn, has been found to neg-
atively influence trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Additionally, Fischer 
and Torgler (2006) have argued that income or wealth disparities might 
make disadvantaged persons envy advantaged persons, which will likely 
result in decreased trust. Hence, the mechanism predicts that demo-
cratically implemented inequality will not alter the trusting behavior of 
those who benefit from inequality; it will instead, reduce trust among 
those who envy the beneficiaries or who are angry about their personal 
situations.  
A study investigating these two mechanisms could be based on 
the study described in the previous section (Chapter 6.2.1). First, the 
baseline trust levels of the participants would be assessed using the de-
scribed version of the trust game. However, in contrast to the previously 
described study, the participants should also state their expectations 
regarding the trust game behavior of their counterpart.  
In the second phase, the participants determine the degree of ine-
quality in the welfare state game in the same way as described above. 
After the results of the welfare state game are revealed to the partici-
pants, their levels of anger and envy should be assessed. Then, the par-
ticipants should again be confronted with the trust game. However, two 
modifications should be made. First, the participants should state their 
decisions as trustor and trustee in two trust games instead of one—one 
trust game against each of the other two group members. For example, 
a lower-class participant in the welfare state game should decide once 
in a trust game with an upper-class participant and once in a trust 
game with a middle-class participant. Second, before participants state 
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their decisions as trustor and trustee, they should state their expecta-
tions about the trust game behaviors of their specific group members. 
By employing this design, it could be analyzed whether the ob-
served levels of anger and envy and/or differences in people’s expecta-
tions moderate changes in our participants’ trust levels.  
Evidence supporting the described mechanism based on the in-
formational value of inequality will be detected if decreases in the ex-
pected trustworthiness of group members (i.e., the expected behavior as 
trustee) mediate decreases in trust within societies that have imple-
mented a high degree of inequality. Evidence supporting the described 
emotion-based mechanism will be detected if anger and envy mediate 
decreases in trust within societies that have implemented a high degree 
of inequality. 
In addition, the design would enable us to investigate whether 
participants’ positions and the positions of their interaction partners 
moderate the effect of specific emotions on trust. For instance, in ac-
cordance with the theory reviewed in Chapter 2, lower-class partici-
pants in the welfare state game should feel particularly angry if they 
learn that their fictive society has decided to implement a high degree of 
inequality to their disadvantage. Furthermore, they might also envy up-
per- and middle-class participants, as both benefit from inequality. 
Hence, their emotions may lead lower-class participants to distrust up-
per- and middle-class participants alike. By contrast, middle class par-
ticipants would actually benefit from the implementation of inequality 
and thus should not experience high levels of anger. However, upper-
class participants benefit even more from high inequality than middle-
class participants, which might still breed envy among middle-class 
participants. In accordance with the theory reviewed, this envy might 
cause middle-class participants to exhibit low levels of trust towards 
upper-class participants, while their trust in lower-class participants 
probably remains unaffected. 
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7 Concluding remarks 
The presented research regards only a small part of what is asso-
ciated to the world of economic inequality. However, I like to think of it 
as brushstrokes in a painting. Hopefully, one day this painting will help 
us to understand the nature and implications of inequality. Chances 
are high that once finalized the painting will portray different worlds; a 
world of those for whom inequality is advantageous and a world of those 
for whom it is disadvantageous. 
If the drastic picture of war between these worlds will be revealed, 
as suggested by Plato millennia ago, still remains to be seen. However, 
the indications are strong that it will at least be a scene of conflict—a 
conflict affecting every one of us. In the future, we should concentrate 
on finding solutions to solve this conflict and the associated problems—
for the good of all. 
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